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ABSTRACT 
Most ethical codes and regulations forbid excessive payment of 
normal, healthy research subjects. Ethical concerns center on the 
capacity of vulnerable subjects to refuse the temptation of excessive, 
or undue, monetary inducement and to protect themselves from the risk of 
injury in participation in research. Subjects most vulnerable to offers 
of money include impoverished persons who lack sufficient economic 
resources to purchase basic necessities and who lack viable options for 
employment. In this discussion, criteria are identified for 
distinguishing due from undue monetary inducement to participate in 
research. Applying fundamental ethical principles, a systematic 
analysis of criteria such as impoverishment of subjects and research 
risk leads to the conclusion that size of payment by investigators 
should be unrestricted except in research presenting the highest 
acceptable risk. 
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PREFACE 
As a Chemistry major at Georgetown University, I designed a 
solvent system for synthesizing organic polymers. In the process, I 
spent two years weighing reactants, distilling solvents and purifying 
and characterizing polymeric products. I made scientific hypotheses, 
constructed data tables, plotted curves, calculated chemical structures 
and predicted the results of future research. 
During a fellowship and, perhaps, afterwards, I will be back in 
the laboratory doing basic science research. Eventually, I plan to 
devote significant time and effort to clinical research. 
In between, while at medical school, I have appreciated the 
opportunity provided by Yale's thesis requirement to make a 
philosophical analysis of ethical issues in research involving human 
subjects. By balancing an understanding of ethical and scientific 
standards in human investigation, I hope to enhance both my care of 
patients and efficacy in research. 
I obtained my introduction to and interest in the ethics of 
clinical research during four years on Yale’s Human Investigation 
Committee (HIC). Special thanks go to Robert Levine, chairman of the 
HIC, for sharing with me his experience and expertise. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Most ethical codes and regulations forbid excessive payment for 
participation in researchNone, however, specify a sum of money 
less than which is a "due" inducement and more than which is an "undue" 
inducement. The latest Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) 
regulations (1981) state only this instruction to Institutional Review 
Boards (IRBs) for approval of research employing persons vulnerable to 
offers of money: "Where some or all of the subjects are likely to be 
vulnerable to coercion or undue influence, such as persons with acute or 
severe physical or mental illness, or persons who are economically or 
educationally disadvantaged, [IRBs shall require that] appropriate 
additional safeguards have been included in the study to protect the 
2 
rights and welfare of these subjects." Beyond this vague reference 
to "appropriate additional safeguards," there are no guidelines to aid 
IRBs and investigators in determining what payments to subjects are 
excessive. There are no detailed instructions for restricting monetary 
inducements. 
My objective in this discussion is to identify criteria for 
distinguishing due from undue monetary inducement to participate in 
research. These criteria are evaluated by considering the historical, 
legal, philosophical and scientific developments that have affected 
research involving human subjects. 

I define and contrast terms such as research and experiment, 
coercion and manipulation, autonomy and beneficence. Research carried 
out in Germany during the Hitler regime exemplifies the worst kinds of 
abuses of research subjects.and signifies the starting point for the 
evolution of modern day's ethical codes and regulations. I consider: 
the publication in the 1950's of research involving disadvantaged 
subjects; the role of voluntary, informed consent research subjects and 
institutional review of research protocols; the fiduciary relationship 
between physicians and patients versus investigators and subjects; the 
vulnerability of impoverished persons who consent to participation in 
research because of the opportunity to earn money; and the example of 
prisoners as a class of persons with maximum constraints on their 
options for earning income. Finally, considering normal, healthy 
persons who are not prisoners, I use this background information to 
identify various criteria for distinguishing due from undue monetary 
inducement. A systematic analysis of these criteria suggests ways for 
investigators and IRBs to evaluate the potential for undue inducement of 
vulnerable subjects to participate in research. 
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EVOLUTION OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS 
Before World War II, courts ruled infrequently on cases of failed 
medical therapy. Juries condemned treatments that deviated from 
established medical practice and called them "experiments." These 
"experiments," what would be considered malpractice today, usually 
involved a single patient who was unaware that anything new was being 
tried.^ In court, most physicians defended their unorthodox practices 
by calling them "innovative therapy." Some of these physicians tried 
"innovative therapy" as a last resort effort and with the best of 
intentions but still were found guilty of "experimenting" and liable for 
patient injury.* 
In New York in 1871, a jury held a physician liable for un¬ 
successful treatment of a dislocated elbow because he did not give 
standard medical advice about immobilizing the joint with a sling. 
In defense of his silence, the physician claimed that he should be able 
to try new modes of therapy. What today's court would recognize as 
gross negligence, the court then called an exercise in 
"experimentation." It ruled:5 
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If the case is a new one, the patient must trust to the 
skill and experience of the surgeon he calls; so must he... 
[if] there is no established mode of treatment. But when the 
case is one to which a system of treatment has been followed 
for a long time, there should be no departure from it unless 
the surgeon who does it is prepared to take the risk of 
establishing, by his success, the propriety and safety of his 
experiment. 
The rule protects the community against reckless 
experiments, while it admits the adoption of new remedies and 
modes of treatment only when their benefits have been 
demonstrated... 
In Missouri as late as 1926, a physician tried an unproven 
infectious agent to cure hemmorhoids. The result: for the patient a 
rectal ulceration and for the physician the court 's condemnation as an 
"experimentor." The judge ruled that: "Failure to employ the methods 
followed or approved by [the physician's] school of practice evidences 
either ignorance or experimentation on his part. The law tolerates 
neither 
These cases involve medical practice, not research, and emphasize 
the importance courts placed upon established medical procedure. The 
burden of proof was upon the "experimentor" to show that his 
"experiment," whether innovative therapy or quackery, was supported by 
some reasonable theory. Concern for patients’ choices was rarely 
mentioned in court decisions. Rather than requiring the consent of 
patients (subjects), courts protected patients' interests by enforcing 
what were considered to be strict standards of medical practice. 
During World War II, research protocols, with or without 
therapeutic components, expanded to employ larger, more diverse subject 
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populations. With development of statistical theory to support 
double-blinded and randomized assignment of subjects to control groups, 
society acknowledged the significant benefits obtained through research 
involving human subjects. Human investigation became accepted. 
Enthusiastic public support resulted in exponential increases in 
funding. Between 1945 and 1965, yearly expenditures for human 
investigation at Massachusetts General Hospital increased 1700% to 8.4 
million dollars; during the same period at the National Institutes of 
Health, annual expenditures for research increased 62400% to 437 million 
dollars. 7 
Parallel with these benefits, however, examples of exploitation of 
research subjects received widespread publicity. The legitimacy of 
clinical research was reevaluated and its accountability was questioned. 
Public hysteria over a perceived potential for physical and 
psychological torture of research subjects began with the notorious, 
coercive practices of Nazi physicians during World War II. These 
heinous crimes committed against war prisoners focused philosophical 
concern on subjects’ consent to participation in research. In 1947, in 
response to these crimes, the Nuremberg Code established the ethical 
groundwork for future codes on human investigation. Governmental 
intervention was the inevitable next step with regulations requiring 
approval of research protocols and review of consent procedures by 
federally mandated committees. 
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DEFINITIONS 
Conceptual errors in the nomenclature of research ethics are 
perpetualized during medical education and through scientific seminars 
and journals. Before elaborating on the historical events contributing 
to present day regulations, and before continuing with a discussion of 
vulnerable classes of persons, the meanings of such terms as research, 
practice and experimentation, as well as coercion, manipulation and 
inducement need to be clarified. During the 1970's, the National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research (the Commission) attempted to clarify the 
nomenclature of research ethics. The Commission standardized basic 
terms and identified fundamental ethical principles before conducting 
its comprehensive investigation of research involving human subjects. 
This investigation culminated in the development of guidelines on the 
protection of research subjects and policy recommendations for the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (DHEW) - now the Department 
of Health and Human Services (DHHS). 
Research and Practice 
In 1972, Thomas Chalmers restated the misconception established in 
earlier court decisions confusing research and practice: "It is 
extremely hard to distinguish between clinical research and the practice 
of good medicine. Because episodes of illness and individual people are 
so variable, every physician is carrying out a small research project 
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D 
when he diagnoses and treats a patient." This misconception, held by 
most physicians, is important to articulate and to clarify because it 
causes physicians to treat patients and subjects similarly when actually 
they have different needs and rights. In defining the terms research 
and practice, the Commission proposed that there were important 
distinctions between the goals of carrying out a reasearch project and 
those of treating a disease. 
"Research" refers to a class of activities conducted to generate 
data through scientific observation. Its purpose is to develop 
generalizable knowledge and to test hypotheses, principles and 
o 
scientific relationships. 
"Practice" refers to a class of activities conducted solely to 
enhance the well-being of an individual patient. Its purpose is to 
provide diagnosis and therapy with a reasonable expectation of 
success.10 Hans Jonas asserted: "In the course of treatment, the 
physician is obligated to the patient and no one else. He is not the 
agent of society, nor of the interests of medical science, the patient 's 
family, the patient 's co-sufferers, or future sufferers from the same 
disease. The patient alone counts when he is under the physician's 
care.1,11 
"Experimentation" equaled quackery in early malpractice trials. 
Semantic confusion between "experimentation" and research explains why 
the public has continued to place negative connotations on research 
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involving humans. According to Levine, who served as special consultant 
to the Commission, "experimentation" refers to a class of activities in 
12 
which something is tested or tried with uncertain results. An 
"experiment" refers ambiguously to either practice or research since 
both involve activities conducted with inherently uncertain results. In 
medical practice, for example, a physician will try different dosages of 
an approved drug in the interest of treating his patient. In research 
designed to study the efficacy of an unapproved drug, specific 
procedures prevent similar adjustment of dosages and, therefore, 
restrict the experimentation typical in routine medical diagnosis and 
therapy.^ This "deprivation of the experimentation ordinarily done 
to enhance the well-being of a patient is one of the burdens imposed on 
the patient-subject in a [randomized clinical trial], 
Another class of activities called "innovative therapy" 
illustrates the subtle contrasts between research and practice. An 
innovative procedure, whether diagnostic, prophylactic or therapeutic, 
is designed solely to enhance the well-being of an individual patient. 
In this sense it is conducted in the context of medical practice and not 
research. Although it may be done routinely, an innovative procedure 
has not been sufficiently tested to determine whether it meets the 
standard of having a reasonable expectation of success.^ Without 
sufficient data to permit a prediction of its safety and efficacy, an 
innovative procedure should be made the object of a research project. 
In this project, however, the therapeutic objectives should not be 
compromised by the research objectives. Since these two objectives are 
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always opposed, "therapeutic research" is nonsensical terminology. A 
systematic collection of data does not in itself benefit 
patients/subjects. 
The Commission made these clarifications on "innovative 
therapy: 
When a clinician departs in a significant way from 
standard or established practice, the innovation does not, in 
and of itself, constitute research. The fact that a 
procedure is "experimental," in the sense of new, untested or 
different, does not automatically place it in the category of 
research. Radically new procedures of this description 
should, however, be made the object of formal research at an 
early stage in order to determine whether they are safe and 
effective. Thus, it is the responsibility of medical 
practice committees, for example, to insist that a major 
innovation be incorporated into a formal research project. 
It has been suggested that a better designation for "innovative 
therapy" is "nonvalidated practice ."^ "Practice" is more accurate 
than "therapy" because diagnostic and prophylactic procedures 
(practices) are meant to be included in the definition along with 
therapy. "Nonvalidated" is more accurate than "innovative" because a 
practice may be new (and therefore innovative) or it may be standard and 
routine but without sufficient testing to merit a prediction of its 
safety and efficacy. 
Ethical Principles 
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Ethical principles are fundamental in justifying or challenging 
judgements about biomedical research involving human subjects. They are 
implicit in ethical norms which indicate how the ethical principles 
should be applied (i.e., whether actions should or should not be done). 
Professional codes and federal regulations are collections of ethical 
norms. In addition to these collections, however, the codes and 
regulations include procedural guidelines detailing how to implement the 
norms in directing and judging the conduct of investigators. 
Three fundamental principles are relevant to the ethical codes and 
regulations on research involving human subjects: respect for persons, 
beneficence and justice. 
Respect for Persons: As the 18th century philosopher, Immanuel 
Kant, wrote: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person 
or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a 
means only." Two precepts are derived from Kant's imperative. 
According to the first precept, respect for persons is intimately 
connected with freedom and liberty and is often interpreted as creating 
a duty to treat persons as autonomous. Autonomous persons are 
self-determining, make their own choices and protect their personal 
interests. They should be free to decide who tresspasses, and when, on 
their bodies. They should not be interfered with unless they agree to 
it. Therefore, autonomous persons who are potential research subjects 
should deliberate about the procedures, alternatives, and harms and 
benefits of a protocol and should be responsible for their decision to 
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participate. Complete disclosure of information about a research 
protocol should override any concern for harm that might occur as a 
result of the disclosure. Autonomous persons do not need protection. 
According to the second ethical precept, respect for persons 
requires that "...persons with diminished autonomy are entitled to 
18 
protection." For example, persons who are dying or incarcerated not 
only need but also are entitled to protection from harm. Protection of 
autonomy does not mean that persons with diminished capacity for 
decision-making should be absolutely prohibited from participating in 
research. Instead, these vulnerable persons should protected against 
treatment as means to others' ends by maximizing their capacity to 
negotiate a voluntary, informed consent and to refuse to consent to 
participation. 
Beneficence: The principle of beneficence originates in one of 
the oldest and most quoted of medical maxims: "As to diseases, make a 
19 
habit of two things - to help or at least to do no harm." 
Hippocrates specified the duty to do good, beneficence, and the duty to 
do no harm (primum non nocere), nonmaleficence. He directed that 
physicians voluntarily assume certain moral duties through their special 
relationship to sick persons. On top of the universal obligation of 
passive noninfliction of harm on others, they should actively prevent 
and remove harms. 
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The Commission gave nonmaleficence a high priority in its 
20 
definition of beneficence: 
The term, beneficence, is often understood to cover 
acts of kindness or charity that go beyond strict obligation. 
In this document, beneficence is understood in a stronger 
sense, as an obligation. Two general rules have been 
formulated as complementary expressions of beneficent actions 
in this sense: 1) do no harm and 2) maximize possible 
benefits and minimize possible harms. 
In the context of biomedical research, beneficence requires that 
physicians promote the health and welfare of not only present but also 
future patients. Physicians should conduct research involving human 
subjects because its goal is to develop information about the 
prevention, diagnosis and treatment of disease. But there remains the 
obligation to "do no harm." Beneficence cannot justify promotion of 
societal benefits through research that intentionally injures subjects. 
However, it can justify intentional exposure of persons to the risk of 
injury when those persons choose to accept that risk to benefit 
themselves or others. 
Justice: The principle of justice can be understood through a 
concept of fairness. Justice is done when a person is given what he is 
due or owed. A person is treated fairly when he gets what he deserves 
. 21 
or can rightly claim. The term "justice" in this essay will be 
confined to mean "distributive justice," the fair sharing of social 
benefits and burdens. Justice has not been done when a class of persons 
is selectively denied a reward, service or opportunity (e.g., the chance 
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to participate in research) to which there is an equal entitlement with 
others. Likewise, a class of persons is treated unfairly when it 
assumes more than its fair share of society's burdens. Since society at 
large enjoys the benefits of research, all citizens should share in 
assuming its burdens. 
Justice has important implications in considerations of who should 
or should not be free to consent to participation in research. 
Essential to distributive justice is this principle attributed to 
Aristotle: "Equals ought to be treated equally and unequals 
22 
unequally." If two classes of persons are equal in relevant 
respects, then both should share equally the burdens of participation in 
research. If two classes of persons are unequal in relevant respects, 
then they should be considered as potential research subjects in 
proportion to their differencesLikewise, no class of persons 
should be denied the right to participate in research unless its 
differences are relevant to the denial. But what differences are 
relevant? What criteria should determine relevance? Should such 
criteria include good or poor health, past or potential accomplishments, 
social worth, legal status, religion, income, race, age, sex, or I.Q.? 
The Commission derived certain recommendations from the principle 
of justice. It concluded that rules and regulations would be unjust if 
they failed to make relevant distinctions between classes of persons. 
Biomedical research should not be an utilitarian endeavor justified in 
creating the greatest benefits for society by using only convenient and 
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disadvantaged persons as research subjects. The Commission interpreted 
fairness as requiring protection of research subjects against abuses 
from investigators - even if this protection resulted in fewer medical 
benefits for society as a whole. A fair sharing of benefits and burdens 
requires special protection of disadvantaged persons. Addressing 
problems in the fair selection of subjects, the Commission recommended 
that:2* 
... the selection of subjects needs to be scrutinized in 
order to determine whether some classes (e.g., welfare 
patients, particular racial and ethnic minorities, or persons 
confined to institutions) are being systematically selected 
simply because of their easy availability, their compromised 
position, or their manipulability, rather than for reasons 
directly related to the problem being studied. Finally, 
whenever research supported by public funds leads to the 
development of therapeutic devices and procedures, justice 
demands both that these not provide advantages only to those 
who can afford them and that such research should not unduly 
involve persons from groups unlikely to be among the 
beneficiaries of subsequent applications of the research. 
Coercion, Inducement and Manipulation 
Intervention by one autonomous person in the actions of another 
needs justification when the intervention limits freedom of choice. The 
broad range of possible interactions between persons establishes a 
continuum at the far ends of which are coercion and persuasion. As 
usual with extremes, coercion and persuasion generally pose no ethical 
dilemmas. The relevant ethical principle, respect for autonomy, is 
easily, effectively engaged. Because respect for autonomy embodies 
freedom of choice, coercion is unjustified and persuasion is justified. 
Between them on the continuum are manipulation, bribery, and offers of 
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inducements. These interventions, discussed shortly, often pose ethical 
dilemmas - especially in biomedical ethics - and may or may not be 
justified depending on which ethical principle is considered to be most 
pertinent. 
Coercion: Coercion denies personal liberty and freedom of 
choice and rarely is justified in dealings with autonomous persons. 
Whereas logic is the means by which rational persons persuade one 
25 
another to a given course of action, coercion requires a threat. 
One person coerces another by explicitly intending to bring about 
harmful consequences unless there is cooperation. To be coerced, a 
person must understand the consequences of the threat and act in large 
part to avoid those consequences. A threat is not coercive if a person 
would have acted in the same way in its absence. A coerced person 
recognizes that he is worse off if he suffers the threatened 
consequences than if he avoids them. For example, a physician coerces 
his patient to participate in research if he deliberately makes hospital 
admission and standard medical therapy contingent upon consent to 
participation in a research project. 
Inducements: Inducements are incentives and do not constitute 
threats. Whatever his interests, urges and weaknesses, the person who 
accepts these offers is not coerced. But offers are made, like threats, 
in order to alter another's behavior by changing the consequences of 
acting one way or another. Nozick has suggested a simple way of 
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26 
distinguishing between offers and threats. If the consequences of 
the new act are improved over the natural and expected course of events, 
they constitute an inducement; if the consequences are worsened, they 
constitute a threat. Likewise, an inducement is offered if a person 
prefers engaging in the new act (because of the improved consequences) 
to the old one; however, a threat is made if a person prefers engaging 
in the old act (except for the worsened consequences) to the new one. 
The presence of an individual's willingness or unwillingness to alter 
behavior marks an important difference between inducements and threats. 
Inducements can take various forms, e.g., money, material reward, 
medical therapy, escape from boredom, friendly attention, curiosity, 
et cetera. They can be unethical without being coercive. Beauchamp, a 
bioethicist at the Kennedy Institute of Georgetown University, asserts 
that "...undue influence occurs whenever someone uses an excessive 
reward or irrationally persuasive technique to induce a person to a 
decision the person might otherwise not reach." Nozick concurs in 
stating that: "A person can be gotten to do something which someone else 
wants him to do, which he otherwise wouldn't do, by offers as well as by 
threats;" he adds that: "...sometimes an offer is so great that a person 
28 
cannot reasonably be expected not to go along with it..." A 
monetary inducement to engage in a particular act may be so great that a 
person does not make his own choice. The decision is made, in this 
instance, by the payment. The payment is undue and unjustified if it 
violates the principle of respect for persons by causing the will of 
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another to predominate and by treating a person as a means rather than 
an end. 
In the context of research, for example, investigators offer a 
substantial inducement to patients if they promise to waive hospital 
fees in return for written consent. This fee waiver is undue inducement 
if it impairs the ability of "volunteers" to weigh the risks of the 
research against the benefits. Besides money, undue inducements may 
include medical therapy. Terminally ill cancer patients are offered 
undue inducements to participate in research if they ignore disabling 
side effects of a highly toxic investigational drug because physicians, 
honest but perhaps unrealistic in their enthusiasm and optimism, present 
the unproven chemotherapy as probably curative. 
Manipulation: Manipulation requires greater psychological 
sophistication and subtlety compared to the crude threats of 
29 
coercion. Coercion and inducements are open about seeking to 
influence behavior, whereas manipulation is more devious about it. Like 
coercion, however, manipulation limits a person's freedom of choice, his 
sphere of autonomy, and treats him instrumentally - as a means rather 
than an end. This limitation involves either deceiving persons, taking 
advantage of their weaknesses or both. 
Deception violates autonomy because truthful communication is 
essential to decision-making. Patients, for example, deceive physicians 
by exaggerating and creating symptoms and manipulate them into 
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mistakenly prescribing more and stronger drugs. The duty of veracity is 
part of the respect that physicians owe patients and research subjects. 
Deception violates this respect because either absence of information 
(silence) or incorrect information (lies) put persons at risk of injury 
by preventing them from realizing possible harms and protecting 
themselves. Physicians-investigators, for example, manipulate patients 
by deliberately refraining from telling them about alternative 
treatments in order to secure their participation in a protocol. 
In clinical practice, physicians may employ deception when 
patients have diminished autonomy and when the principle of beneficence 
justifies therapeutic privilege (therapeutic privilege may be called 
benevolent deception or paternalism). For example, physicians can be 
justified in deceiving a dying patient when they do not explain the 
critical nature of an illness so that the patient maintain a 
psychologically healthy outlook. In medical practice, the Hippocratic 
Oath does not oppose this kind of misrepresentation. In medical 
research, however, deception is rarely justified except in some 
behavioral studies 
Manipulation can also involve taking advantage of others' 
perceived weaknesses.Investigators take advantage of the 
physician-patient relationship and patients' dependency when, if 
patients do not want to consent to participation in a research project, 
investigators act in an angry or disappointed fashion. Since 
investigators know that patients will probably find the pressure 
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irresistable, they are taking advantage of patients' vulnerability. 
Referring back to the example of the waiver of hospital fees, if the 
investigator purposefully offers a tempting monetary incentive because 
he knows his patient needs money, he not only provides inducement to 
give consent, but also manipulates that patient into giving consent. In 
addition to manipulation, this combination of monetary inducement and 
32 poverty constitutes bribery. 
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HISTORICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO INFORMED CONSENT 
.prisoners were used just as rats, guinea pigs and rabbits 
are used in .the laboratory and sometimes without showing them 
as much consLcteration as we show our animals in the 
laboratory." 
With these words in 1947, Andrew Ivy, a physician who consulted 
for the U.S. Naval Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and who testified as 
an expert witness at the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, described the 
treatment of participants in "experiments" to develop a typhus vaccine. 
The protocol, designed by Nazi physicians, required the injection of 
blood from prisoners with acute typhus fevers into other prisoners who 
fell into one of three groups: 1) the unvaccinated control group, 2) the 
vaccinated group (the German vaccine was already known to be ineffective 
compared to the American vaccine), and 3) the "passage group," used to 
keep the vaccine alive, virulent and readily accessible. Most 
participants had been already threatened with execution. Many of them 
died with acute typhus infection. Ivy continued: "The crux of the 
ethical question pertaining to the Nuremberg trial from the medical 
viewpoint is whether condemned prisoners should be experimented on 
without their consent. ...My answer to that question is no."^ 
At the Nuremberg trials, similar physically and psychologically 
torturous "experiments" were defended by the Nazi physicians in the name 
of medical research and societal benefit. Although the so-called 
investigators were prosecuted for committing barbaric war crimes (albiet 
under the directive of higher Nazi authorities), these war crimes were 
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considered by the Nuremberg Military Tribunal to represent compelling 
examples of the potential for abuse of subjects in modern biomedical 
research. Since no ethical or legal standards existed by which the 
physicians/researchers could be judged, a set of rules were developed 
for the Nuremberg Military Tribunal. These ten rules became known as 
the Nuremberg Code. 
In spite of the heinous nature of the torture conducted by 
physicians, the Nuremberg Code did not condemn most types of future 
medical research. Some of its rules, if restrictive by 1940's 
standards, articulated in simple terms a minimum standard that is taken 
for granted today. For example, Rule II specifies that acceptable 
research involving human subjects must "...yield results for the good of 
society that are unprocurable by other methods..This research must 
be "...based on the results of animal experimentation..." (Rule III), 
must be "...so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and mental 
suffering and injury" (Rule IX) and must be "...conducted only by 
scientifically qualified persons" (Rule XIII). 
The first rule of the Nuremberg Code makes the most significant 
contribution to the ethics of research involving human subjects. It 
provides the definition of informed consent that has been used in all 
subsequent codes and regulations:^ 
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The voluntary consent of the human subject is 
absolutely essential. 
This means that the person involved should have legal 
capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able 
to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of 
any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or 
other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should 
have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the subject 
matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and 
enlightened decision. This latter element requires that 
before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the 
experimental subject there should be made known to him the 
nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method 
and means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences 
and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon 
his health or person which may possibly come from his 
participation in the experiment. 
This first rule provides a definition of informed consent that is 
rigorous in its requirements and includes four essential elements: valid 
consent must be competent, informed, comprehending and voluntary. 
Informed consent and its elements are primarily justified by the 
principle of respect for persons. In case law as well as medical 
ethics, informed consent provides a framework for judging whether 
physicians have fulfilled their duty to respect autonomy. In a classic 
opinion, Supreme Court Justice Cardoza gave the operational definition 
of autonomy: "...every human being of adult years and sound mind has a 
right to determine what will be done with his own body..."^ In 
research as well as medical practice, autonomous persons possess both 
legal and ethical rights to self-determination. Through informed 
consent, patients-subjects protect their own interests by deciding 
whether or not to expose their body to the risks of participation in a 
research project. They should obtain a thorough understanding of the 
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relevant information about procedures, alternatives and possible injury 
and should be able to weigh for themselves the risks of participation 
against the benefits. 
Elements of Valid Consent 
Competence to consent: Competency is more a precondition of 
informed consent than an element of informed consent."*7 In biomedical 
research, competency means legal competency. Infants, children, the 
mentally retarded and the comatose include persons who are legally 
incompetent to give informed consent because of immaturity, legal status 
(e.g., seventeen year olds who are able to understand information), 
mental retardation or neurological damage. Whereas competent persons 
make reasonable decisions based upon rational deliberation, incompetent 
ones, except for the special case of older children, lack the capacity 
to comprehend information and to act voluntarily (two of the other 
elements of valid, informed consent). Although incompetent persons 
cannot make their own choices about participation in research, some of 
them need specialized medical care that can be developed and improved 
only through research involving them. Since incompetent persons have no 
autonomy, the principle of beneficence requires that guardians protect 
them from participating in research that may be harmful. When infants, 
for example, must be research subjects, parental or guardian 
authorization is mandatory. 
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Disclosure of Information: Rule I of the Nuremberg Code 
specifies that a research subject should know "...the nature, duration, 
and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be 
conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and 
the effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from his 
participation in the experiment." Although their goal is similar, 
today's regulations require much more detailed disclosure (the specific 
laws are not relevant, here). 
In medical practice, the principle of beneficence can justify a 
more flexible standard of disclosure than can the principle of respect 
for autonomy. A physician's duty to protect patients from harm comes 
into conflict with and sometimes overrides the duty to inform them 
fully. Therapeutic privilege permits nondisclosure of information that 
physicians claim probably would cause physical or mental harm to a 
patient. 
In research, the standard of disclosure is based upon what the 
"reasonable person" (the average of rational lay persons in society) 
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would consider necessary information about a research protocol. 
This standard has been established by case law in medical practice and 
is not different from standards of disclosure in other professions where 
there is a fiduciary relationship. Disclosure need not approximate the 
scope and depth of physicians' knowledge about diseases, risks, 
complications, and statistics. During the consent process, the 
"reasonable person" standard is satisfied by the minimum of information 
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required by the regulations in a consent form. Except for this minimum 
of information, the investigator has practically no legal requirement to 
provide individual informational needs (ideally, however, investigators 
attempt to satisfy these individual needs by answering subjects' 
questions). 
Comprehension of Information: Regardless of the quantity of 
information presented and how it is presented, inadequate comprehension 
by potential subjects precludes valid informed consent. Information 
should be conveyed under circumstances that permit enough time for 
subjects to weigh the risks and benefits, consider alternatives and ask 
questions. For example, in a study of new birthing techniques, the 
informing process should be conducted in advance of the proposed 
research to avoid coincidence with the onset of labor or the 
administration of pain medications. In addition, when obtaining the 
consent of persons with diminished capacity to understand information 
(e.g., because of limited education or senility), the use of technical 
language should be commensurate with the intellectual capacity of the 
subjec t. 
In routine practice, uncomprehending consent can still be valid 
consent if the physician can justify the use of therapeutic privilege. 
In research, however, uncomprehending consent violates the principle of 
respect for persons. Competent patients sometimes hold blind trust in 
their physician-investigator and refuse full disclosure of information 
about a research project. Because of their faith, patients may magnify 
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their vulnerability to participation in research that presents risk of 
injury and to treatment as means rather than ends. In this situation, 
physicians-investigators should show respect for subjects 'autonomy, 
whether the risks of participation are minimal or substantial, by 
imposing the undesired information upon these subjects or foregoing the 
research. Then, although subjects may study the procedures, 
alternatives, and harms and benefits and become as informed as the 
"reasonable person," they may choose to ignore the information and act 
upon irrelevant, irrational and emotional viewpoints grounded in 
instincts and intuitions. Obviously, investigators cannot anticipate or 
prevent unapparent personal or psychopathological motivations. 
Uncomprehension of information illustrates the concept of 
intrinsic constraints and introduces the fourth element of informed 
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consent, voluntariness. Voluntariness implies freedom to make 
choices about one's own destiny, ft necessary condition of comprehension 
is that persons possess the inherent, or intrinsic, freedom to make 
rational decisions. Except for the case of older children, for example, 
legally incompetent persons possess constraints on this intrinsic 
freedom. Infants, the mentally retarded and the comatose are 
constrained by immature or defective neurological circuitry. These 
neurological constraints on the autonomous, decision-making authority of 
incompetent persons are intrinsic because they may be objectively 
evaluated and measured (viz., by neurological testing and mental status 
examinations). Uncomprehending persons who are not incompetent (e.g., 
uneducated persons, psychotic and sedated patients) also possess 
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intrinsic constraints. In the next section on voluntariness, the 
objective nature of intrinsic constraints will be contrasted with the 
subjective nature of extrinsic constraints. 
Voluntariness: "The voluntary consent of the human subject is 
absolutely essential." (Nuremberg Code, Rule 1). 
A voluntary decision to participate in research is a free choice 
made without the influence of coercion, manipulation or undue 
inducement. These deliberate interventions totally nullify valid 
consent. On the other hand, the influence of reasonable inducements, 
pressures or persuasion does not negate voluntariness. Because undue 
and due inducements to consent to participation fall along a continuum, 
the factual determination of when consent is not voluntary - when a 
person is not free to refuse participation - must be made individually 
and in light of the particular circumstances. In some cases, no sharp 
boundary can be drawn between inducements that are undue and those that 
are merely enticing. 
Drawing a contrast between intrinsic and extrinsic constraints on 
voluntariness causes more blurring of this boundary. As described, 
intrinsic constraints can be objectively assessed and measured. In the 
case of incompetent persons, intrinsic constraints include immature or 
defective neurological circuitry. They vitiate the freedom to make 
choices, the capacity to make rational decisions and the voluntary 
consent to participate in research. In contrast, extrinsic constraints 
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include needs, desires, family demands and other pressures that are part 
of the normal burden of everyday existence. It is the subjective nature 
of extrinsic constraints that prohibit a predictable assessment of their 
effect on persons' vulnerability. For example, there may or may not be 
significant increase in the vulnerability of persons who need more than 
most other persons or who earn less than the average wage. An 
evaluation of constraints such as needs and desires must be made 
individually and without objective determination of the exact degree to 
which these extrinsic constraints limit the freedom of persons to make 
rational decisions. 
Even in the exceptionally constrained environment of prisons, 
voluntariness may be preserved enough that consent to participation in 
research may be valid. Although prisoners possess the neurological 
capacity to comprehend information and to make rational decisions, there 
are other constraints on their freedom of choice. Both intrinsic and 
extrinsic, these constraints do not necessarily negate voluntariness; 
however, they place severe limitations on it. Intrinsic constraints 
include, for example, the unavoidable and necessary effects of 
institutionalization (deprivation of liberty and dependency on 
authority), as well as impoverishment, inadequate medical care and 
substandard living conditions. Examples of extrinsic constraints are 
individual prisoner's boredom and hope for parole. These constraints, 
although they make participation in research extremely attractive do not 
imply that the only possible inducements for prisoners undue ones. 
Constraints as compelling as poverty and hope for parole need not 
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invalidate voluntary consent to serve in medical research as long as 
excessive sums of money and reduction of sentence are forbidden 
inducements. 
Historical Developments in Informed Consent after WW II 
The Nuremberg Code was intended to provide a basis for 
international law. In the U.S., however, the legal standing of the 
N.C., as well as that of other codes of research ethics including the 
Declaration of Helsinki (1964) and the AMA Ethical Guidelines for 
Clinical Investigation (1966), remains undefined. In so far as these 
codes have been adopted by the medical profession as standards of 
conduct, they can be used to establish researchers' duty and to bring a 
verdict for a research subject. 
In the New England Journal of Medicine, Beecher in 1966 disclosed 
thirty-two examples of published research involving subjects for whom 
the consent status was unclear. All of these research projects 
presented more than minimal risk of injury to the subjectsHis 
disclosures received widespread publicity and contributed to renewed 
suspicion of biomedical research involving human subjects. In the 
shadow of Nazism, each example reminded ethicists and legislators of the 
possibility of errors in the ethical judgement of doctors conducting 
otherwise commendable and scientifically valid research. Beecher 
emphasized that:*1 
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An experiment is ethical or not at its inception; it 
does not become ethical ad hoc - ends do not justify means. 
There is no ethical distinction between ends and means. 
One year before Beecher's article, the potential for abuses of 
subjects by investigators came under extensive federal scrutiny and 
eventually resulted in laws requiring institutional review of protocols 
and consent procedures to ensure better protection of the welfare of 
research subjects. Three examples of the kinds of studies that provoked 
more comprehensive regulation of investigators are presented below: 
Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital (JCDH) 
In a 1960's study of cellular immunity, twenty-two hospitalized, 
terminally ill and mostly elderly persons received injections of cells 
of human cancer tissue. The objective of the study was to gain 
knowledge about immune defenses against cancer cells; the study was not 
intended to confer therapeutic benefits. The subjects were told that 
they would receive "some cells." No investigator mentioned the word 
"cancer."^2 Given the unlikelihood of harm resulting from these 
injections, the investigators felt justified in their lack of disclosure 
and decided to avoid the possibility of upsetting the patients and 
causing refusals to participatein addition, they neither 
presented their study for peer review at the JCDH nor asked the approval 
of all of the physicians who directly cared for the subjectsWhen 
brought to court for fraud, the investigators were sentenced to one 
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year's suspension of license; upon appeal, their sentence was commuted 
to one year's probation. 
Milledqeville State Hospital (MSH) 
During the late 1960 's at MSH in Georgia, institutionalized, 
mentally ill patients were enrolled in research equivalent to today's 
Phase I clinical trials. Most of these patients were legally 
incompetentInvestigators intended to generate pharmacological 
data on the distribution, metabolism and excretion of unapproved drugs 
and not to confer specific therapeutic benefits. They administered 
these investigational drugs without obtaining the consent of the 
patient's guardians, without informing the patients' private physicians 
and without soliciting institutional review by peers. A subsequent 
state investigation of staff practices at MSH prompted the Medical 
Association of Georgia to recommend that future research studies have 
potential therapeutic benefit to the subjects' physical or psychiatric 
illness, that guardian's consent be obtained, that clinical 
psychiatrists be informed of the studies and that an institutional 
committee review every protocol. 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
In the early 1930's, the United States Public Health Service 
(USPHS) funded and conducted a study of the natural history of untreated 
syphilis. The subjects included 400 black, mostly impoverished males 
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with syphilis and 200 controls without syphilis. The study was 
terminated abruptly in 1973 only after it came to public attention that 
investigators had not obtained subjects’ consent and that, although 
participants who died usually underwent autopsies, ongoing evaluation of 
procedures had not been conducted conscientiously. Through 1973, 
investigators did not prescribe penicillin to treat either the syphilics 
or controls who contracted syphilis and even tried to prevent subjects 
from obtaining outside treatment 
The Tuskagee Study endured until public outrage stopped it. Until 
1973, it continued to violate the ethical rules of consent established 
in the Nuremberg Code and all subsequent codes and regulations. It 
continued to be conducted by the USPHS in spite of the dramatic impact 
of cancer cell injections at JCDH and metabolic drug studies at 
Milledgeville State Hospital for the mentally ill. The Tuskagee Study 
was not terminated in spite of review by DHEW in 1967 (when all USPHS 
research programs underwent review) and another review in 1969 which 
concluded that, although a similar study never would be repeated, the 
consent of subjects in the existing study still would not be 
47 obtained. 
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FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS 
You think that we may trust implicitly to the humanity 
of the physiologists? - Absolutely. I know these men; they 
are just as humane as any other men; and to place these 
vexatious restrictions upon them is an insult. 
— Sir William Osier giving testimony before the Royal 
Commission on Vivisection about yellow fever experiments 
conducted by Walter Reed on human volunteers (1906). 
Perhaps because it is true that investigators can only be "as 
humane as other men," susceptible to similar pressures and demands, the 
Royal Commission of Great Britain in 1906 should have mandated the first 
committees to review research involving human subjects. 
1953 was the first year when USPHS guidelines formally required 
committee review of research involving human subjects. For thirteen 
years, however, these guidelines applied only to intramural research 
being conducted at the NIH. In 1966, Federal policy extended the 
requirement of institutional review to extramural research receiving 
USPHS grants. The purpose of review committees was to assess the 
judgement of the principal investigator and to protect the interests of 
research subjects. The Surgeon General signed and circulated this 
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policy statement: 
This review should assure an independent determination: 
(1) Of the rights and welfare of the individual or 
individuals involved, (2) of the appropriateness of the 
methods used to secure informed consent, and (3) of the risks 
and the potential medical benefits of the investigation. 
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In 1974, DHEW issued regulations (45 CFR 46) requiring that 
committees called Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) be located in 
institutions where investigators were conducting research involving 
human subjects. The primary duties of institutional review did not 
change: IRBs should balance "...society's interests in protecting the 
rights of subjects and in developing knowledge that can benefit subjects 
or society as a whole."50 What changed significantly were membership 
requirements. In 1974, DHEW regulations no longer permitted committees 
made up entirely of scientists and physicians in the investigators' 
immediate peer group. These regulations reflected earlier guidelines 
revised by USPHS in 1969: "...[Tjhe membership should possess not only 
broad scientific competence to comprehend the nature of the research, 
but also other competencies necessary in the judgement as to the 
acceptability of the research in terms of institutional regulations, 
relevant law, standards of professional practice, and community 
acceptance." The addition of non-scientists to committees was intended 
to help ensure the protection of other non-scientists - the elderly, the 
poverty stricken, the uneducated - who were included in the most likely 
populations of potential research subjects. 
The most recent regulatory revisions, passed in 1981, were based 
upon recommendations made by the Commission in 1978. The Commission 
used general ethical norms to develop specific recommendations about 
which bureaucratic duties should be assigned to IRBs. IRBs review 
protocols to assure that research will be conducted in accord with the 
ethical standards established by these norms. The Commission employed 
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the five ethical norms contained in most codes and regulations on 
research involving human subjectsProtocols should incorporate: 1) 
good research design, 2) competent investigators, 3) equitable selection 
of subjects, 4) a favorable balance of harm and benefit, and 5) informed 
consent. 
IRBs devote unequal attention to each of the ethical norms. IRB's 
evaluate research design and competency of investigators to the extent 
that these factors influence the harm-benefit ratio of the research. 
The duty to evaluate scientific design is usually delegated to the 
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funding agencies. In addition, IRBs spend relatively little time 
deciding whether subjects will be equitably selected except when 
reviewing protocols involving obviously vulnerable populations (e.g., 
prisoners and the mentally ill) .^ Instead, the greatest efforts are 
devoted to defining the balance of harm and benefit and to ensuring 
voluntary, informed consent. The information in protocols about research 
procedures and precautions combined with the expertise of IRB members 
should provide adequate resources to make a consistent and accurate 
assessment of the harm-benefit ratio. Guaranteeing voluntary, informed 
consent, on the other hand, remains a most elusive goal in spite of the 
attention given to it and the emphasis placed upon it. 
Determination of Voluntary, Informed Consent 
Since World iVar II and the Nuremberg Code, voluntary, informed 
consent of subjects to participate in research has been the primary 
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concern of ethicists and legislators. Because IRB members do not 
intrude upon the privacy of the investigator-subject relationship and do 
not oversee directly the completeness and comprehension of information 
and the voluntariness of subjects' consent, the consent form is the 
primary mechanism by which IRBs attempt to assure valid consent; 
however, it also may be the weak link in the chain of events connecting 
IRBs to valid consent. IRBs often become caught up in conforming to the 
letter of the law and in satisfying specific regulations concerning 
documentation of informed consent. A disproportionate regulatory burden 
on consent forms reinforces IRB concern with a tool that by itself 
cannot ensure voluntary, informed consent. IRBs may spend more time 
rewording consent forms than reviewing investigators' plans to negotiate 
consent 
Because even IRB members may confuse their ethical and legal 
responsibilities, the differences between voluntary, informed consent 
and legally valid consent (embodied in a signed consent form) need 
clarification. Voluntary, informed consent functions to show respect 
for subjects' rights to make choices and to protect themselves. The 
consent form contains only the minimum amount of information that should 
be presented to prospective subjects and, at best, should serve as a 
guide for investigators in their negotiations with subjects. The 
consent form cannot accomplish the objectives of an appropriate 
communication between physicians and subjects. In fact, if the consent 
form is used as the only source of patients ' information and 
comprehension and not as a minimal guide for fuller consent, then it 
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acts to antagonize and defeat the physician-patient relationship (this 
special relationship is described in the following chapter). It 
diminishes the spirit of consent by encouraging investigators to collect 
signatures. 
Documentation of consent on consent forms, like the signing of a 
commercial contract, also functions to protect the investigator and his 
institution against legal liability should a subject claim that he was 
not told about the risk of a particular injury. A subject need not 
understand the content of a consent form nor be provided a reasonable 
opportunity to ask questions about a project in order to give legally 
effective consent. Documentation is the major reason why there is 
little successful litigation against physicians doing research compared 
to their colleagues practicing routine medicine.^ 
Even if a consent form provides sufficient information explained 
with such appropriate vocabulary that it permits understanding by 
subjects of all pertinent aspects of a research project, it does not 
guarantee voluntary consent. History has demonstrated that 
investigators, although trustworthy in general, are only "as humane as 
other men. Protection of the autonomy and voluntariness of subjects has 
appeared to require extensive regulations and review committees. 
However, no matter what number of "vexatious restrictions" are placed 
upon researchers, the privacy of the physician- patient and the 
investigator-subject relationships will always permit a certain freedom 
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in the negotiation of consent and especially in the protection of 
voluntariness. 
Besides specific restrictions on research with prisoners, children 
and the mentally ill, the following, broadly worded statements are the 
extent to which regulations intervene to protect the voluntariness of 
subjects' decisions to consent to participation in research: 
... An investigator shall seek [legally effective, informed] 
consent only under circumstances that provide the prospective 
subject ... sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not 
to participate and that minimize the possibility of coercion 
or undue influence. 
... Where some or all of the subjects are likely to be 
vulnerable to coercion or undue influence, such as persons 
with acute or severe physical or mental illness, or persons 
who are economically disadvantaged, [IRB approval requires 
that] appropriate safeguards have been included in t/ia study 
to protect the rights and welfare of these subjects. 
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Physician-Patient and Investigator-Subject Relationships 
Rule I of the Nuremberg Code suggests a contractual relationship 
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between researchers and subjects: 
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the 
quality of the consent rests upon each individual who 
initiates, directs or engages in the experiment. It is a 
personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated 
to another with impunity. 
In medical practice, the consenting process consummates the 
implicit contractual relationship between physicians and patients. When 
a consent form is signed - as when patients-subjects decide to undergo a 
procedure and to participate in research - this contractual relationship 
becomes explicit. In business transactions, the contract is commercial 
in nature. Each party is responsible for obtaining information about 
the contract and understanding its terms and implications. Businessmen 
are profit-motivated, self-motivated and not expected to take measures 
to protect the personal freedom of their clients. In medicine, the 
contract is fiduciary in nature. Physicians and other professionals 
(e.g., lawyers, clergymen) who provide expert services because of 
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special training, experience and institutionally validated status, 
must assume a more specific standard of respect for persons (clients). 
Their fiduciary relationship with patients-subjects requires greater 
respect for autonomy and therefore a greater duty to observe the 
conditions of valid, informed consent. Both commercial and fiduciary 
contracts (the latter being embodied in consent forms) are legal proof 
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of consent. The difference is their respective purposes: a tool to 
document explicit liabilities versus a guide to promote respect for 
persons. 
Beecher postulates that a benevolent investigator assures greater 
protection of subjects than does informed consent 
An even greater safeguard for the patient than consent 
is the presence of an informed, able, conscientious, 
compassionate, responsible investigator, for it is recognized 
that patients can, when imperfectly informed, be induced to 
agree, unwisely, to many things... 
Expressing comparable idealism, Katz imagines that informed 
consent should unite the investigator and the subject in a 
partnership 
... Informed consent would entail, if it is truly seen as an 
invitation, asking for consent, seeking authorization to 
proceed, and not making a demand under the guise of a 
symbolic egalitarian gesture. It would necessitate sharing 
knowledge and admitting ignorance, answering questions and 
identifying unanswerable questions, appreciating doubts and 
respecting fears... It requires that the interaction between 
investigator and subject become a partnership, giving the 
subject the right to determine what should be done for and 
with him, and forcing the investigator to be explicit in what 
he wants to do and why. 
The fiduciary relationship helps to equalize the imbalance of 
power between physicians and patients. The status of being a patient 
implies dependency, passivity and diminished freedom to make choices. 
The sick person is emotionally, personally committed to the physician's 
explanations about diagnosis and prognosis and recommendations about 
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treatment. The sick role, in proportion to the severity of the illness, 
embodies an exemption from normal, social duties and responsibilities 
(e.g., from continuing with employment or from making decisions); to be 
legitimized, however, this exemption requires that the sick person "be 
taken care of:" that he seek the help of and cooperate with a 
physician 
In the purely therapeutic setting, this status can justify 
paternalistic acts aimed at benefiting patients who are believed to be 
incapable of acting rationally on their own behalf. Therapeutic 
privilege justifies a physician in limiting the disclosure of 
information about risks of procedures when the disclosure would 
seriously upset a patient and therefore be medically contraindicated. 
Unfortunately, therapeutic privilege also accomodates abuse of the faith 
patients have in physicians. Patients who can act rationally should be 
encouraged to do so. Instead of promoting paternalism, the fiduciary 
relationship is intended to promote self-determination through informed 
consent and to restrain physicians from imposing unwarranted paternalism 
upon autonomous persons. 
Some freedom is permitted between physicians and patients that 
should not exist when the physicians are also investigators. Because 
the purpose of research is to develop generalizable knowledge and to 
benefit society and because the procedures in research are tried with 
uncertain results and possible risks, subjects should be protected 
against the potential for exploitation. In accordance with the elements 
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of informed consent in medical practice, investigators must, with rare 
exception (e.g., an emergency), fully inform potential subjects and then 
assess their comprehension and voluntariness. In the name of patient 
welfare, paternalistic acts should not justify exploitation of patients' 
dependency on physicians and violation of subjects' rights to be 
informed, weigh harms and benefits, consider alternatives and ask 
questions. For example, a researcher should not avoid informing a 
patient (subject) about the alternatives to treatment available in an 
investigational protocol because he thinks they will only confuse and 
upset the patient. 
Freedom of choice is most threatened when physicians take 
advantage of their power because they believe they are acting for the 
benefit of patients. Therapeutic privilege has absolutely no relevance 
in protocols that are not combined with therapeutic benefitIt has 
limited relevance in innovative practices when disclosure of information 
might upset a patient so much that the patient no longer can evaluate 
objectively the risks of a diagnostic procedure or treatment. Whereas 
patients in a purely therapautic setting are entitled to delegate 
decision-making authority to their physicians, they relinquish this 
entitlement when they become research subjects. If the research 
incorporates no therapeutic components, investigators should treat 
patients as they would treat healthy, normal volunteers: obtain valid 
informed consent or forego the research. Patients' right to delegate 
authority and to refuse information about a procedure diminishes as the 
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procedure involves fewer therapeutic benefits and is conducted more in 
the interests of research than of standard practice. 
When the roles of clinical practitioner and investigator overlap, 
conflicts of interest can impair patient care. The role of a 
practitioner may be compromised by concerns about diagnostic, 
revenue-producing tests and payment for services. These concerns, 
however, do not inherently conflict with the objective of due care of 
individual patients. The role of a research scientist is guided by 
pressures to generate high quality data and to test hypotheses. 
Financial rewards through grants and contracts, academic advancements 
and reputation, obsessive scientific interest - all these personal 
objectives may directly subtract from the objective of patient care and 
may add to pressures upon investigators to use subjects as means to ends 
only. Although both roles are justified by benefiting the sick, the 
practitioner benefits patients immediately while the investigator 
provides potential benefits to future patients. 
Even in protocols that offer extremely large, potential benefits 
to society, compromise of patient care violates the principle of 
beneficence and is not justified. Physicians entrusted with the care of 
patients should not use their status to obtain a signed consent form 
rather than to seek voluntary, informed consent. Patients with minor 
disease would rather give consent to participation in research conducted 
by their physician than take a chance of jeopardizing their future 
relationship when seriously ill. Dying persons and persons with a 
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prolonged or painful chronic illness are particularly vulnerable to 
invitations to participate in research. For example, patients with 
end-stage cancer who have exhausted standard treatments usually do not 
feel a sense of final duty or curiosity about trying investigational 
drugs. Instead, they may feel stranded without the hope of therapeutic 
options, in need of attention (even by research staff), desperate for a 
miracle cure and vulnerable to any invitation to try new chemotherapy 
when it is made available through a protocol. Such patients usually 
sign a consent form. 
Other classes of persons besides hospitalized patients are 
vulnerable to inducements to consent to participation in research. 
Prisoners, students and staff of researchers, the elderly, unemployed, 
uneducated and impoverished - all healthy, normal persons - have 
particular constraints upon their freedom to make choices about refusing 
to participate in certain kinds of research. While patients, in 
general, enlist in protocols that offer some therapeutic advantages, 
other vulnerable persons are invited to consent to research procedures 
that frequently do not benefit them directly. These other classes of 
potential subjects are lured by monetary inducements. 
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VULNERABLE PERSONS 
The gross abuses against voluntariness in Nazi prisoner camps 
provide rare examples of coercion in (what was claimed to be) biomedical 
research. The Nuremberg Code and subsequent federal regulations on 
informed consent and IRB review were formulated to ensure that these 
gross abuses never reoccur. And they have not. Therefore, because 
regulations have prevented what are obviously unjustified interventions 
between investigators-subjects, emphasis has turned towards refinements 
of what are less clearly unjustified interferences with freedom of 
choice. 
Rule I of the Nuremberg Code states that subjects be "so situated 
as to be able to exercise free power of choice without undue inducement 
or any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress or any other form of 
constraint or coercion." In other words, persons must be free to refuse 
participation in research. In the vast pool of society's potential 
research subjects, most persons do not need special protection of 
autonomy in the consent process. Some persons, however, are vulnerable 
to inducements to participate in research. Levine defines vulnerable 
persons as "those who are relatively (or absolutely) incapable of 
protecting their own interests. More formally, they have insufficient 
power, prowess, intelligence, resources, strength or other needed 
attributes to protect their own interests through negotiations for 
informed consent. 
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The extent to which persons are vulnerable, like the range of 
interventions in freedom of choice (from coercion to persuasion), 
establishes a continuum. For example, all persons are tempted by offers 
of large sums of money. But compared to relatively affluent individuals 
who may desire to become more wealthy, impoverished individuals 
"consider it necessary to assume extraordinary risk or inconvenience in 
order to secure money or other economic benefits that will enable them 
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to purchase what they consider to be the necessities of life." 
Compared to wealthy persons, impoverished ones are more likely to 
participate because of monetary inducement. 
Prisoners and Vulnerability to Monetary Inducements 
Prisoners exemplify a population of healthy, nonhospitalized, 
potential subjects who are vulnerable to inducements to participate in 
research. In 1968, Martin and his colleagues studied the likelihood of 
securing research subjects from different classes of personsThey 
considered four different protocols presenting a range of risk and 
discomfort. They found that all classes of persons were likely to 
volunteer for the protocol presenting the least risk and discomfort. As 
the risk increased, however, prisoners were most likely to volunteer, 
followed by fire and police personnel and, finally, professionals. 
Although recent legislation has substantially curtailed research 
conducted in prisons, this discussion assumes that prisoners, under the 
appropriate circumstances, should be allowed to volunteer as research 
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subjects. According to the principle of respect for persons, prisoners 
should not be deprived of the opportunity to make decisions about their 
lives. Any systematic deprivation of this opportunity would violate the 
principle of justice (the fair distribution of burdens and benefits) by 
arbitrarily excluding prisoners from access to the benefits of 
participation in research.67 Both the principles of respect for 
persons and beneficence imply that the liberty of persons, because 
incarceration removes so many options, should not be reduced further by 
removing yet another option: participation in research. These 
principles also require, however, that prisoners be protected from 
exploitation. Given that prisoners have a right to participate in 
research, this protection should involve maximizing voluntariness by 
minimizing vulnerability and constraints on self-determination. 
The prison environment is designed to foster submission, 
conformity, and "to surround the inmate with symbols of constraint, 
isolation and intimidation; these include the massive gates, thick 
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walls, and armed guards." To effect criminal punishment and 
rehabilitation, the prison environment establishes a deliberate 
dependency on authority. Prisoners are not supposed to make decisions 
or to control their conditions of confinement. Constant supervision and 
inspection place intrinsic constraints on their freedom and privacy. 
These conditions are unavoidable. Avoidable conditions exist, however, 
and include substandard living conditions such as inadequate medical 
care, lack of basic amenities for personal hygiene, overcrowding and 
limited opportunity to fulfill a need to work 
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Prisoners are deprived relative to the rest of society and 
therefore have less to lose and more to gain by participation in 
biomedical research. Institutionalization creates deprivation, drabness 
and boredom; prison life dictates monotonous routine from which any 
change can bring relief. Incarceration, even if work is available, 
prevents substantial monetary reward. Most prisoners are impoverished - 
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states usually pay the incarcerated less than one dollar per day 
and seek any alternative means to earn money. Parole and reduction of 
sentence dominate prisoners' concerns. Prisoners are desparate to 
demonstrate any "good behavior" that they perceive will influence 
positively the parole board and prison officials,7^ Participation in 
research offers "...an opportunity to prove one's good will, one's 
eagerness to pay his debt to society, one's sincere intention to make up 
for past evils and be good!!"74 
Wells and his colleagues in 1975 published the results of a study 
of prisoners' motivation to participate in research.75 Prisoners' 
reasons were ranked in this order: 1) opportunity to make worthwhile 
contributions to benefit society, 2) opportunity to make worthwhile 
contributions to benefit medical science, 3) curiosity, 4j opportunity 
to improve living conditions, 5) opportunity to exhibit courage, 6) need 
for money, 7) opportunity to relieve the boredom of prison life, 8) 
opportunity to receive better treatment from officers and other 
correctional staff, 9) opportunity to be part of a group and meet 
others, 10) greater chance of getting a job or position upon release, 
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11) opportunity to stay out of trouble, 12) opportunity to take drugs, 
13) greater chance of getting an earlier parole, 14) opportunity to be 
excused from doing other activities, 15) a close friend was already 
participating, 16) opportunity to escape from feared others, 17) 
opportunity to receive better health care, 18) opportunity to feel more 
important, 19) reduction of present and/or future restrictions and 20) 
opportunity to be admired by other prisoners. 
Except for the hope of an earlier parole, these reasons are 
similar to those ranked by "normal," nonprisoner volunteers. Altruism 
and curiosity are principal motivations. Both are ethically acceptable. 
Although other incentives such as earlier parole might be more important 
to prisoners over the long term, cash payment for participation in 
research provides such a rare opportunity to make money that one would 
think it should rank higher on the list. In fact, in spite of Wells' 
results, most scholars still maintain that valid, informed consent is 
vitiated "by forces ...that unduly influence,"76 - as by cash 
payments.77 
Until regulations in 1981 resulted in a moratorium on research in 
prisons, most research involving prisoners was funded by private 
pharmaceutical companies conducting phase I drug studies of metabolism 
and bioavailability. In fact, almost all phase I studies were done on 
prisoners. While investigators and society at large derived 
important pharmacological information and improvements in medical care 
from these trials, prisoners as a class were rarely full beneficiaries 
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of the improvements in medical diagnosis and therapy. Because payment 
was the primary benefit in participation in phase I trials, prisoners 
provide a model of persons vulnerable to cash payments. 
Cash payments made by drug companies to nonprisoners are both 
customary and ethically acceptable. However, when prisoners are 
invited to consent to participation in research, monetary inducements 
introduce complex and conflicting ethical issues. For example, some 
drug companies pay wages fifteen times greater than those paid in other 
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prison jobs. Because these wages are still one tenth the amount 
paid to nonprisoners, there is conflict between a monetary reward that 
is so small as to violate equal treatment of persons (the fair sharing 
of the benefits of participation in research) required by the principle 
of justice but so large as to violate freedom of choice required by the 
principle of respect for persons. This conflict introduces several of 
the obstacles in deciding what is excessive, or undue, payment. In the 
following chapter, these obstacles willbe examined in detail. 
Justice: Prisoners should be treated fairly and should be paid 
wages equal to what nonprisoners are paid for participating in the same 
research - no more and no less. A discussion of the validity of this 
statement introduces the dilemma of opposing precepts of justice and the 
conflict between protection of vulnerable persons and equal pay for 
equal work. 
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If prisoners are paid less than nonprisoners, they are denied 
benefits that nonprisoners receive for participation in the same 
research. This disparity may not be unfair, however, because only 
equals should be treated equally. Unequals should be treated unequally 
when the differences are ethically relevant. In the case of prisoners, 
incarceration and inability to earn money may result in a substantial 
vulnerability to payment compared to nonprisoners. When this difference 
in vulnerability becomes ethically relevant, the principle of respect 
for persons conflicts and prevails over the precept of justice requiring 
equal pay for equal work. This vulnerability should be minimized by 
paying less money to prisoners than to nonprisoners. 
The less that prisoners are paid for participation in research, 
however, the more that drug companies have an economic incentive to 
concentrate their drug testing in prisons. Prisoners not only receive 
fewer of the monetary benefits of participation in research compared to 
the rest of society, they become means to others' financial ends. In 
addition, since subjects' wages are small compared to the overall cost 
of drug approval, the economic incentive may not be most important. 
Drug companies also employ prisoners as research subjects because of 
convenience and expediency. 
No class of persons is better suited than a prison population for 
phase I trials requiring long-term regularity and control of subjects' 
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conditions. Prisoners live in environmental uniformity and 
constitute a stable, confined population ideal for the monitoring of 
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diet, activity and other research parameters. From the point of view of 
drug companies' investigators, prison populations can conveniently 
devote time to lengthy, repeated trials and can optimally serve medicine 
and scientific efficiency. 
If prisoners are paid less than nonprisoners, the principle of 
respect for persons also conflicts with a second precept of justice 
requiring fair distribution of research burdens. Whether the incentives 
to drug companies are economic or utilitarian, concentration or phase I 
trials in prisons causes inmates to assume a larger share of the burdens 
of participation in research. In its deliberations on research 
involving prisoners, the Commission considered it important "...to 
ensure the equitable distribution of the burdens of research no matter 
82 - 
how large or small those burdens of research may be." The 
Commission recommended that research in prisons should be limited to: 
"[sltudies of the possible causes, effects, and processes of 
incarceration and studies of prisons as institutional structures or of 
prisoners as incarcerated persons ... provided that they present minimal 
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or no risk and no more than mere inconvenience to the subjects." In 
addition, it permitted "[rjesearch on practices, both innovative and 
accepted, which have the intent and reasonable probability of improving 
OA 
the health or well-being of the individual prisoner..." 
Respect for Persons: Prisoners should be provided maximum 
freedom to refuse participation in research and should be paid sums 
commensurate with payments in other prison jobs - no more and no less. 
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A discussion of the validity of this precept of respect for persons 
introduces the problem of paternalism and the concept of risk. 
In the deprived prison environment, a payment fifteen times 
greater than in other job opportunities may impair the rational capacity 
of prisoners in at least three ways. First, this payment may cause 
prisoners to enter a research project when they would be unwilling to do 
so if the payment was reasonable (i.e., in proportion to other prison 
wages) or if they were not incarcerated. Second, it may cause them to 
give insufficient consideration to the risk of bodily injury (if the 
protocol presents any risk). Finally, it may cause prisoners, once they 
are entered into a protocol, to continue as research subjects and to 
remain quiet about adverse reactions that would cause the displeasure of 
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prison authorities and their dismissal from the protocol. 
Although impoverishment may cause prisoners to expose themselves 
to greater risk in order to secure a tempting sum of money, it does not 
follow that impoverishment necessarily is ethically relevant and impairs 
their capacity to make rational decisions. Cohen, a philosopher at the 
University of Michigan, has affirmed the rational capacity of prisoners: 
"If the standard of [voluntariness] be that potential subjects be free 
of all conditions that may significantly influence their willingness to 
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consent, we will have no subjects and no research." Like other 
persons, prisoners make decisions that are influenced by the constraints 
of their particular situation. Constraints such as poverty and low 
paying jobs give prisoners good reasons to seek alternatives for earning 
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money and not to refuse participation in research. Unless these 
constraints diminish prisoners' autonomy in a way that is determined to 
be ethically relevant, they do not justify protecting prisoners by 
restricting payment. Protection of autonomous persons constitutes 
unwarranted paternalism. 
Furthermore, if a tempting sum of money does impair prisoners' 
rational capacity, it does not follow that temptation necessarily is 
ethically relevant and violates the principle of respect for persons. 
As shall be discussed, diminished autonomy and a tempting sum of money 
are by themselves insufficient criteria for identifying excessive 
payment. The third criterion is the degree of risk presented by the 
research. There is no ethical relevance if the research presents little 
potential for harm. If a tempting sum of money is offered in return for 
participation in research that presents little risk, the mere fact that 
prisoners' situation makes the reward exceptionally attractive does not 
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necessarily mean that undue inducement has been applied. On the 
other hand, if the research presents significant risk of injury, a 
tempting sum of money violates the principle of respect for persons and 
justifies restricting payment so that prisons deliberate more seriously 
about their best interests. 
Although phase I drug trials always present a risk of unknown 
injury from the investigational drug's side effects, they almost always 
do not result in this injury. If there is no need for prisoners to be 
able to protect themselves from bodily harm by weighing the harms of 
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participating against the benefits, then there is no entitlement to 
protection from harm by restrictions on payment. In general, the fewer 
the potential harms presented by research, the larger the permissible 
inducement. 
In its deliberations on research involving prisoners, the 
Commission suggested various solutions to the problem of cash 
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payment: 
... Fair solutions to this problem are difficult to achieve. 
One suggestion is that those who sponsor research pay the 
same rate for prisoners as they pay other volunteers, but 
that the amount actually going to the research subject be 
comparable to the rates of pay otherwise available within the 
facility. The difference between the two amounts could be 
paid into a general fund, either to subsidize the wages for 
all inmates within the prison, or for other purposes that 
benefit the prisoners and their families. Prisoners should 
participate in managing such a fund and in determining 
allocation of the monies. Another suggestion is that the 
difference be held in escrow and paid to each participant at 
the time of release or, alternatively, that it be paid 
directly to the prisoner's family. 
The extraordinary constraints of incarceration complicate an 
analysis of what is excessive, or undue, monetary inducement Poverty 
is not an isolatable factor in prisoners' vulnerability to participation 
in research. Focusing on impoverished classes of persons better 
illustrates vulnerability to cash payments and provides the basis for 
distinguishing between due and undue inducements. 

- 58 - 
DUE AND UNDUE MONETARY INDUCEMENTS 
Three factors can be immediately identified as potential critieria 
for defining and distinguishing between due and undue monetary 
inducements to participate in research. These factors are 
impoverishment of subjects, the size of payment and the risk of injury 
in participation in the research. They will provide the framework for a 
systematic analysis of due and undue monetary inducements. In order to 
narrow the scope of this analysis, it is stipulated that: 
1) the subjects are normal, healthy persons. 
2) the subjects comprehend fully-disclosed information; only their 
voluntariness is in question. 
3) the subjects participate in research that confers no direct, 
health-related benefit. 
4) the investigators do not offer money to manipulate deliberately 
subjects' impoverishment. Investigators are simply reimbursing 
subjects for their time and energy in order to obtain a sufficient 
number of research subjects. 
Within these boundaries, impoverishment of subjects and size of 
payment will be explored in two research protocols. One protocol 
involves minimal risk of injury to subjects while the other involves 
significant risk. Before continuing with these protocols, however, 
certain concepts should be clarified. 
Normal, Healthy Persons: Instead of patients who are sick or 
dying and persons who are institutionalized, potential subjects in this 
discussion are limited to classes of normal, healthy persons. These 
classes of persons can be distinguished by financial need and can be 
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separated into three groups. This separation is grounded in an 
objective appraisal of the intrinsic need of money by persons in each 
class. The most financially deprived classes of persons are included in 
one group: the unemployed welfare recipients and the elderly surviving 
on Social Security. They usually do little to consume their daytime 
hours and lack the usual means of earning enough money to purchase basic 
necessities. The most financially independent classes of persons are 
included in another group: professionals such as corporate executives 
and lawyers who, without exception, would make more money at the office 
than at the clinical research center (CRC). They have little extra time 
to devote to activities outside of their career. The last group 
includes classes of persons with an intermediate degree of need of 
money: the large pool of students in undergraduate and medical colleges 
who enroll routinely as subjects in research protocols to make money on 
short notice and with brief time commitment. 
Voluntariness: Assuming that potential subjects understand 
information that is fully disclosed, the only obstacle to valid, 
informed consent is their voluntariness. The effects of cash payments 
on voluntariness can be broken down into problems presented by intrinsic 
and exrinsic constraints. 
One problem in defining a single monetary sum as due or undue is 
that each group has different intrinsic, financial needs. An objective 
assessment of the relative impoverishment of potential subjects is 
grounded in the determination of employment status, educational status 
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or status of family and financial dependents at home. This information 
is obtained in every complete history. An adequate assessment does not 
require knowing exactly the amount of income earned or tuition paid. The 
important point is that a dollar has more value for persons with low 
income than for those who are rich; moreover, all other factors (e.g., 
extrinsic constraints) being equal, relative income reliably predicts 
when a sum of money is an unrefusable offer and when it is a slight 
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temptation. Considering only intrinsic constraints, this prediction 
is accomplished simply by ranking subjects' need of money. This need is 
proportional to vulnerability to cash payments. After a complete 
history, investigators should be able to identify classes of 
impoverished persons (if these persons do not lie) and, therefore, to 
begin the determination of an appropriate material reward. 
Another, more complex problem in defining objective criteria for 
distinguishing between due and undue inducements is that individuals 
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attach different values to money. They have different extrinsic 
constraints on voluntariness depending on their work ethic, 
sociocultural context and personal idiosyncrasies. For example, some 
persons who sell investment bonds on a commission basis are willing to 
work fourteen hours a day in exchange for substantial additional income. 
Others place greater value on leisure time or family life and prefer to 
work the minimum hours necessary to earn a salary that supports their 
life style. Thus, within a group, some subjects perceive a particular 
cash inducement as irresistible while others who earn the same amount of 
money perceive that payment as unremarkable. 
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There are no objective measures for ranking individual, subjective 
perceptions of the importance of money. Pragmatically, investigators 
cannot assess the value schemes of potential subjects. It would require 
greater communication between investigator and subject than even Katz 
envisions in his ideal partnership; more than "... sharing knowledge and 
admitting ignorance, answering questions and identifying unanswerable 
questions, appreciating doubts and respecting fears,..." it would 
necessitate a complete psychosocial evaluation. According to Macklin, 
who is Associate Professor of Community Health at Albert Einstein 
Medical College, the different value schemes among persons "present 
almost insurmountable difficulties for any attempt to find a workable 
criterion for distinguishing due from undue monetary inducements to 
serve as a research subject." On this point, Newton, who is professor 
of philosophy at Fairfield University, concurs that "...to provide equal 
'inducement ' to different people would require offering a different 
amount of money to each person for the same work." It is the effect of 
the payment, not its size,that determines undueness. 
Cash Payments: Payment of research subjects would be 
unnecessary if enough persons volunteered because of curiosity or 
altruism. Cash payments have become traditional and customary, however, 
because without sufficient compensation, inadequate numbers of subjects 
would consent to participate in today's numerous Phase I drug trials and 
protocols investigating normal physiology. Although the scientific and 
medical knowledge gained through these research projects provide 
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important health-related benefits to society as a whole, none of these 
benefits are offered directly to the subjects. Instead of medical 
benefits, these normal, healthy volunteers decide to participate in 
research because of monetary benefits. The greater the cash payment, 
the more seriously potential subjects consider consenting to 
participate. 
Concept of Risk: Equal in importance to the vulnerability of 
potential subjects and the size of cash payments, the risk involved in a 
research project is a factor in distinguishing due from undue monetary 
inducements. 
The term "risk" entails a prediction of some future occurrence of 
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harm. In general, the risk of physical or psychological harm to 
normal, healthy research subjects is not especially significant; being a 
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research subject is usually not hazardous. One study has 
demonstrated that the risks to subjects in Phase I drug trials are 
somewhat greater than those of being an office secretary, one-seventh 
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those of window washers and one-ninth those of miners. Another 
study surveyed Phase I drug trials in prisons and determined that a 
"clinically significant medical event" occurred once every 26.3 years of 
individual subject exposure. In 805 protocols involving 29,162 
prisoners over 614,534 days, none of the 58 adverse drug reactions 
caused death or permenant disability (one of these prisoners died while 
receiving a placebo). 
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According to DHHS regulations enacted in 1981, '"minimal risk' 
means that the risks of harm anticipated in the proposed research are 
not greater considering probability and magnitude, than those ordinarily 
encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical 
or psychological examinations or tests." (Section 46.102). Minimal risk 
excludes the slightest possibility of physical or psychological injury. 
It describes burdens imposed upon the research subject that are more 
appropriately referred to as inconvenience, embarrassment and 
discomfort. Thus, because minimal risk implies only the slightest risk, 
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more accurate terminology may be "mere inconvenience." For example, 
research procedures that present minimal risk (mere inconvenience) 
include being observed in a clinical research center, answering a 
questionnaire, having blood drawn and collecting urine or feces. 
Research maneuvers presenting more than minimal risk to normal, 
healthy volunteers need appropriate justification. In research 
involving patients, diagnostic and therapeutic maneuvers (nonvalidated 
practices) may present substantial risk of physical and psychological 
injury but still may be justified by the expectation of benefit for 
individual patients as well as for society as a whole. In research 
intended to contribute only to generalizable knowledge, the only 
justification of risk to normal, healthy volunteers is the potential 
benefit to society. Because these volunteers derive no health-related 
benefits, the Commission cautioned against exposing them to 
"unreasonable risks." It did not recommend, however, that IRBs should 
become paternalistic guardians. The Commission emphasized subjects' 

- 64 - 
responsibility to weigh for themselves the risks of research against its 
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advantages: 
... [Ilf the prospective subjects are normal adults, the 
primary responsibility of the IRB should be to assure that 
sufficient information will be disclosed in the informed 
consent process, provided the research does not present an 
extreme case of unreasonable risks. 
Just as individuals attach different weights to money, so they 
attach different weights to risk and to the advantages and disadvantages 
of participating in research. What some persons perceive as dangerous 
research because of potential risk of injury and discomfort, other 
persons treat indifferently and gladly accept to gain significant 
remuneration. This willingness or unwillingness of subjects to expose 
themselves to risk and discomfort further complicates an evaluation of 
the dueness of cash payments. If there is no standard measure of 
unreasonable risk, there is no standard measure of undue inducement. 
Ideally, persons who place high value on money and low thresholds on 
risk should be treated differently from those who place low value on 
money and high thresholds on risk. 
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Research Involving Minimal Risk 
Consider a phase I drug trial in which the investigational drug is 
administered by intravenous infusion. The protocol requires an 
overnight stay in a clinical research center, timed collections of blood 
and urine, measurements of vital signs and questionnaires about side 
effects. Although the probability and magnitude of harm from this 
particular investigational drug is unpredictable in humans, phase I 
trials in general (based on review of millions of days of exposure of 
normal subjects to phase I drugs) present minimal risk. Other "risks" 
of participation include the probability of inconvenience or 
embarrassment because of bruising from intravenous catheters, urinating 
into a plastic jug, sleeping in an unfamiliar setting and being awakened 
throughout the night. Recruitment is accomplished by flyers posted on 
bulletin boards in churches, unemployment offices and university 
corridors and dormitories. Subjects are fully informed. Written 
consent is documented. Subjects are paid the hourly, minimum wage. 
As shall be shown, minimum wage does not predominate over the will 
of normal, healthy students, professionals or impoverished persons. It 
does not impair their capacity to weigh the possible inconveniences 
presented in this drug trial. Therefore, minimum wage does not violate 
the principle of respect for persons and is not an undue inducement. 
Students: Students generally have a number of work options 
available to them. Since they are able to join work-study programs or 
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find other jobs that pay minimum wage or more, the inducement to consent 
to participation in this drug trial cannot be undue. It does not 
predominate over students’ will. In fact, minimum wage may be too low 
for students to consider it seriously as a due inducement. If their 
goal is to earn money, students often elect to expose themselves to 
greater discomfort by working longer, more pressured hours in a 
restaurant or bar. 
An undue payment impairs potential subjects' capacity to judge the 
risk of participation in research. This impairment is not ethically 
relevant if the research presents little risk of injury. Although an 
investigational drug presents a possibility of harm due to unknown 
reactions and side effects, such reactions are rare in phase I trials. 
(The inconveniences in this study are minimized further if the subjects 
are medical students or graduate students at a medical center; there is 
not the usual anxiety and nausea at the sight of intravenous catheters, 
at the thought of infusions of chemicals and not the usual embarrassment 
over urination into plastic jugs.) Because subjects do not need to be 
able to protect themselves, the loss of their capacity to judge risk is 
a moot issue. Because there is little risk in participation, subjects 
do not need protection from harm by restrictions on payment. 
Participation in this study can be regarded as regular employment. 
There is no difference between payment to participate in this study and 
payment to do unskilled labor. Students render a service to 
investigators: cooperation; in return, investigators compensate students 
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for their time and inconvenience. Because students are compensated only 
for time and inconvenience, they are not different from other unskilled 
employees (e.g., janitors and nighttime security guards). Just as 
market forces determine the wages earned by unskilled laborers, so these 
market forces should determine the wages earned by students in phase I 
drug trials. 
Just as the participant in this phase I drug trial is an employee, 
so the investigator is an employer. The contractual relationship 
between investigators and subjects becomes more commercial than 
fiduciary. As long as the recruitment techniques are fair (e.g., 
students are not pressured to participate because they are members of 
the primary investigator's laboratory staff), the subjects' status is in 
no way passive or dependent. The students do not require the expertise 
of physicians to understand the risk in participation. There are no 
procedural details or implications that cannot be completely elucidated 
in a consent form. In contrast to the relationship between patients and 
physicians, this relationship between students and physicians implies no 
passive, emotional subjugation. There is no need for subjects to put 
faith in the expertise and skills of investigators. There is no special 
trust or covenant. The fiduciary relationship loses its relevance. 
As employers, investigators advertise their job opportunity by 
posting flyers in those areas frequented by prospective candidates. 
After recruiting applicants, investigators interview them to assess 
their qualifications for the job (i.e., good health that is 
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uncomplicated by major medical problems that might interfere with an 
accurate determination of the investigational drug 's bioavailability, 
metabolism and excretion). After applicants are informed of the 
conditions of employment (including salary), they sign a contract 
(consent form) if they want to be hired. 
A common instance in which investigators act as employers includes 
research involving questionnaires. Consider research in which students 
answer questions, for example, about attitudes towards parental 
discipline. In addition to the usual safeguards ensuring 
confidentiality, students do not have to answer any questions that they 
do not want to answer. The only inconveniences are time commitment and, 
however unlikely, psychological stress related to memories about 
heavy-handed parental discipline. Because subjects are not dependent 
for their safety upon the expertise of the investigators as physicians, 
there is no imbalance of power between subjects and investigators. 
There is no possibility of undue inducement. Although prudent 
investigators will want to keep the levels of pay low, no amount of 
money would be too much. 
Referring again to the phase I drug trial, if instead of minimum 
wage the payment is one or two dollars hourly, students would not 
seriously consider wasting their time at a clinical research center. As 
noted already, they have access to many job opportunities that pay 
minimum wage or more. 
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Consider an equally unrealistic wage of fifty dollars per hour. 
There is nothing about phase I testing that suggests that subjects 
deserve greater payment than the hourly minimum wage. There are no 
harms or discomforts for which there should be extra reimbursement. 
Participation in research as a noble pursuit and for the sake of mankind 
does not in itself merit extra reward. If for some reason, however, the 
wage does happen to be as substantial as fifty dollars per hour, does so 
much money violate the principle of respect for persons? This salary 
would probably cause students to ignore the risk of injury in phase I 
drug testing. Because this risk is minimal, however, the incapacity of 
vulnerable persons to refuse participation is irrelevant . Students, 
however diminished their autonomy because of need for money, are not 
treated as means to ends by an inflated payment to participate in phase 
I drug testing any more than they are by the same payment to sweep 
hallways. For the fortunate students who happen to come across the 
flyers advertising this research, the bigger the inducement the better. 
Furthermore, fifty dollars hourly wage does not violate the 
principle of justice. Since this phase I study presents practically no 
risk of injury, there can be no disproportioning of the burdens of 
serving as research subjects. If the risk is not ethically relevant, 
unwarranted paternalism occurs when the principle of justice is applied 
to justify protection of impoverished persons. Students who participate 
as subjects probably assume fewer burdens than if they decided to work 
in a restaurant or bar. 
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ft payment as large as fifty dollars per hour can become an undue 
inducement, however, if subjects are not normal, healthy volunteers. 
Macklin has stated that: "Inducements are undue if they prompt subjects 
to lie, deceive, or conceal information that, if known, would disqualify 
98 
them as participants in a research project." Thus, if the 
investigational drug has been shown to be hepatotoxic in animals with 
underlying liver disease, investigators would include as part of their 
exclusion criteria a history, for example, of viral hepatitis, ft 
subject who lied about a history of jaundice secondary to hepatitis B 
infection would be exposed to a greater risk of injury. Since the 
decision to lie and to ignore this risk of injury both result from 
subjects' perceived need of money, the payment predominates over the 
will of the subject and is undue. Although such a drug trial presents 
no greater risk to normal, healthy subjects than does the one previously 
described, the subject in this example has lied about a significant 
medical problem. The more an individual differs from the ideal of a 
normal, healthy volunteer, the less he or she falls within the 
boundaries of this discussion. 
Impoverished Persons: In this phase I drug trial as well as in 
other research involving only time and inconvenience, the same 
considerations apply to the working poor and to unemployed welfare 
recipients as applied to students (incidentally, students sometimes have 
less money than either of these classes). If participation exposes 
subjects to minimal risk of injury, compensation should be unrestricted. 
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Because there is no concern for undue monetary inducement, market forces 
should determine the wages earned by financially deprived persons. 
Although large payment is ethically justified, small payment 
raises the question of fair sharing of research burdens in society and 
violation of the principle of justice. In accordance with the forces of 
supply and demand, investigators would offer the lowest wage that could 
attract sufficient numbers of research subjects. If payment falls below 
minimum wage, recruited subjects would probably be in the lower social 
and economic classes. Despite this selection bias towards impoverished 
persons, however, there would be no violation of the principle of 
justice in phase I testing. The risk of injury, although finite, is too 
small to be ethically relevant to considerations of equitable 
distribution of research burdens in society. 
If justice required equal sharing of research burdens "...no 
matter how large or how small those burdens may be", protection of 
subjects would require raising the payment until a sufficient number of 
higher wage earners decided to participate. Pragmatically, the 
Commission's concerns are untenable. This protection would be 
ineffective: unless payment is increased substantially above what 
volunteers are paid customarily, there is little incentive for higher 
wage earners to participate. 
Professional Classes: For professionals, as for students and 
impoverished persons, no inducement is undue for participation in phase 
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I c/rug trials. Most likely, no payment could surpass the earning 
potential of professionals who stayed at work in the office. In 
addition, professionals are unlikely to learn about a drug study. Since 
recruitment is conducted among those populations expected to become 
volunteers, professionals rarely see flyers advertising the research. 
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Research Involving More Than Minimal Risk 
Consider a study of physiological mechanisms in the regulation of 
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hepatic glucose uptake in normal, healthy subjects. Following an 
overnight fast, the procedure involves insertion of three short 
catheters and one long one. One short catheter is inserted into a 
peripheral arm vein for infusion of substances; another into a femoral 
or brachial artery for taking blood samples; and the third into a 
femoral vein for sampling blood from the leg. The long catheter is 
passed, under fluoroscopic control, via a peripheral arm vein, through 
the right atrium and into the hepatic vein (if there are no suitable arm 
veins, a femoral vein is used). After the catheters are placed, a dye 
is infused (to measure hepatic blood flow) for one hour followed by 
infusion for another hour of either saline, propranolol, phentolamine, 
or both propranolol and phentolamine. A 200 gram glucose load is 
ingested followed by an additional four hours of infusions. Over the 
six hour study, approximately 300 ml of blood is drawn. Risks include: 
subcutaneous hematomas, venous or arterial thrombophlebitis, venous 
perforation by the long catheter, arrhythmias, hypotension secondary to 
propranolol or phentolamine, and low-dose radiation exposure. 
This discussion of research involving more than minimal risk 
focuses upon impoverished persons who, given their economic deprivation, 
comprise the population most vulnerable to monetary inducements. If 
unrestricted payment of impoverished persons could be justified for 
participation in research involving risk of injury, then, everything 
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else being equal, unrestricted payment of students and professionals, 
who have more opportunities to earn money, would also be justified. 
In this study of normal physiology, minimum wage is not undue 
inducement for impoverished persons. Before developing reasoning why 
minimum wage doe not violate the principle of respect for persons, it is 
instructive to clarify certain distinctions between research involving 
minimal and higher risk. Relevant distinctions occur in purpose of 
payment, violation of justice, and job status. 
Payment: In both protocols, payment has two purposes. In 
addition to remuneration for the services rendered by subjects, payment 
acts as an incentive, or temptation, "...without which too few subjects 
could be recruited."100 Remuneration to subjects - what is their due 
for participation in research - embodies the notion of what is a fair, 
or just, wage. Incentive to subjects, on the other hand, is determined 
solely by supply and demand. In the phase I drug trial, there is no 
distinction between payment which is a fair salary for subjects' time 
and energy and that which is an incentive dependent on market forces. 
In the physiology protocol involving invasive procedures, however, 
increased payment remunerates not only for subjects' time and energy, 
but also for their exposure to extra risk of injury and the likelihood 
of pain. Because of greater risk of injury, payment which is fair 
salary can surpass that which merely induces the participation of 
sufficient numbers of subjects. If the payment to subjects in this 
portocol is minimum wage, for example, impoverished persons are not 
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offered fair remuneration for their exposure to possible inguinal 
hematoma, groin pain and femoral venous thrombosis. 
As discussed shortly, a wage that fairly remunerates research 
subjects may violate the principle of respect for persons by causing 
undue inducement, particularly in the case of impoverished persons, to 
participate in research presenting risk of injury. As discussed first, 
however, a low wage that merely attracts a sufficient number of subjects 
may violate the principle of justice. 
Justice: When research presents risk of injury, market forces 
can create a selection bias towards impoverished persons who not only 
earn a disproportionately low wage (e.g., compared to football players 
or divers who also place themselves at risk of injury), but also bear a 
disproportionately large share of research burdens in society. In 
general, as the probability and magnitude of injury increase, a 
significant difference can occur between the amount of money required to 
remunerate for exposure to risk and that required to induce the 
participation of a sufficient number of persons most vulnerable to 
offers of money. In deciding on the payment of subjects, investigators, 
to save money, may be disposed to offer an amount commensurate with an 
incentive instead of due remuneration. They would set payment low 
initially, raising it gradually until enough subjects had been 
recruited.^ In an attempt to justify this reimbursement scheme, 
investigators might argue that just as market forces determine what 
payment shall be made to subjects participating in research involving 

- 76 - 
only time and inconvenience, so these forces should determine payment in 
research involving risks. 
When research procedures involve sufficient risk of injury, 
reliance on market forces can result in disproportionate sharing of 
research burdens. As Macklin states, "[sletting the payment as low as 
would be necessary to gain a subject pool would virtually ensure that 
those subjects would be drawn from lower social and economic 
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classes." This bias is not ethically relevant in the phase I drug 
trial, as discussed, because the research burdens are minimal. In the 
physiology study, however, if payment were minimum wage, not only would 
impoverished persons receive payment that is low considering the risk 
involved, but also they would bear significant burdens that are not born 
by other members of society. The socioeconomic status of impoverished 
persons already makes them last to receive the benefits accrued as a 
result of the research. Therefore, the smaller the payment in this 
physiology protocol, the greater the selection bias towards impoverished 
persons and the greater the violation of the principle of justice. 
There exists a logical solution to this problem of inequitable 
distribution: to disregard market forces by adjusting the payment of 
research subjects to be in proportion to their different levels of 
income.^3 This solution may create more problems than it solves, 
however, by conflicting with a second precept of justice that requires 
equal pay for equal work. 
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These two precepts of justice are in such irreconcilable conflict 
that a choice must be made between them or the research foregone. For 
reasons that follow, the ethical precept requiring equal pay for equal 
work prevails over the one requiring equitable distribution of the 
burdens of research. Macklin prefers equal pay for equal work because, 
in the case of a variable payment scale, "[vlolunteers would be sorely 
tempted to lie about their income in order to receive higher pay as a 
research subject. There are more compelling reasons. Legally, 
there is no precedent for such blatant economic discrimination against 
disadvantaged persons (except for prisoners). Pragmatically, it would 
be a formidable if not impossible task to design a variable payment 
scale involving three or more reimbursement rates. An equally 
formidable task would be to determine which subjects get which rate. 
Although an estimate of individual income status may be obtained in a 
thorough history, there are, as already pointed out, insurmountable 
difficulties in assessing the value each person places on money and risk 
and the priority each places on participation in research. 
An underlying ethical objection to a variable payment scale 
eclipses legal and pragmatic objections. The problem is grounded in 
paternalism. Although a discussion of paternalism leads directly into 
conclusions about distinctions between due and undue inducements, it is 
helpful first to clarify why paternalism is commonly an issue in 
research involving more than minimal risk. The most important reason is 
exemplified by the distinction between the nature of employment in the 
physiology study and in the phase I drug trial. 
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Job Status: In the phase I drug trial, although subjects are 
carefully monitored by a skilled investigator, they are not usually 
dependent for their safety on the expertise of this investigator. 
"Informed consent" plays a mechanical role and the consent form only 
documents liabilities and responsibilities as in a commercial contract. 
In the physiology study, however, healthy volunteers can remain healthy 
volunteers only if the skills of the investigator persevere over the 
challenge of several venous and arterial catheterizations. Thus, 
subjects entrust this investigator with their health and well-being. 
Because a physician draws upon the same training and experience and 
performs the same invasive procedures in the CRC as on the hospital 
wards, the relationship between subjects and the investigator is 
fiduciary. Like a physician practicing clinical medicine, the 
investigator assumes a special standard of respect for persons and a 
special duty to negotiate valid, informed consent. Moreover, the 
investigator conducting this physiology study has an additional duty: to 
maximize the capacity of subjects to protect themselves from potential 
harm. 
This duty to protect subjects' capacity to refuse participation in 
research, an ethical duty for investigators as well as a legal one for 
IRBs, returns the discussion to a variable payment scale and to the 
problem of paternalism. To be justified as a solution for inequitable 
distribution of research burdens, the pay scale must limit the wage of 
impoverished persons and must cause them to evaluate risk more carefully 
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and thereby to protect themselves from burdens that are great enough to 
be ethically relevant. Although risk may be more than minimal, the 
majority of protocols approved by IRBs present risk that is not 
ethically relevant. The physiology study, for exarrple, presents obvious 
potential for causing temporary anxiety and physical discomfort, but 
little potential for causing severe pain and permenant disability. 
In most research, therefore, whether or not every subject is an 
impoverished person, the risk of injury is not relevant to problems of 
equitable sharing of research burdens. /Is unwarranted paternalism, a 
variable pay scale violates subjects' autonomy and deprives impoverished 
persons of the opportunity to earn not only as much money as possible, 
but also as much money as students and others for participating in the 
same reseach. Instead of fair sharing of research burdens, the 
prevailing precept of justice is equal pay for equal work. 
Impoverished persons' share of research burdens might be decreased 
more fairly by offering all subjects more money in accord with equal pay 
for equal work instead of selectively offering impoverished persons less 
money in accord with a variable payment scale. If the effect of equal 
pay were to raise all subjects' wages reflecting fair remuneration, 
fewer impoverished persons would be research subjects. Although more 
impoverished persons would want to earn the extra money, fewer of them 
would be able to participate because more students and wage earners also 
would want the money and would compete for the available positions. On 
the other hand, if the effect of equal pay were to lower all subjects' 
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wages reflecting market forces, impoverished persons probably would be 
the only subjects. 
Respect for Persons: When research involves more than minimal 
risk, a wage that fairly remunerates research subjects may violate the 
principle of respect for persons. A due salary - more payment than that 
required to attract merely a sufficient number of research subjects - 
may cause undue inducement of impoverished persons to participate in 
research and to expose themselves to risk of injury. Although respect 
for persons requires treatment of individuals as autonomous agents, it 
also requires that individuals with diminished autonomy be protected. 
Unwarranted paternalism is potentially the most important ethical 
objection to protection of impoverished persons. As discussed, if the 
risk of injury is not ethically relevant, unwarranted paternalism occurs 
when the principle of justice is used to justify protection of 
impoverished persons from a disproportionate share of research risk. 
Likewise, it can occur when the principle of respect for persons is used 
to justify their protection from payment that does not actually 
predominate over their capacity to refuse participation in research and 
to judge risk of injury. Distinctions between due and undue inducements 
can be approached by addressing the problem of paternalism and by 
contrasting the degree of need for protection of diminished autonomy 
between impoverished persons and other vulnerable populations. 
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Although impoverished persons are obviously vulnerable to monetary 
inducements to participate in research, they are not as constrained by 
this vulnerability as patients and prisoners are constrained by 
vulnerability to (nonmonetary) inducements. Impoverished persons are 
less vulnerable due to poverty than patients are vulnerable due to 
illness and a fiduciary relationship embodying dependency and passivity; 
or than prisoners are vulnerable due to incarceration and a contrived 
environment designed explicitly to restrict options. Therefore, 
self-determination is less diminished in impoverished persons than in 
patients and prisoners. Impoverished persons are not as entitled to 
protection against inducements to participate in research. Paternalism 
is less warranted. 
Except for economic deprivation, impoverished persons are without 
disabling constraints (e.g., illness, incarceration, senility, and 
retardation) that could diminish their capacity for rational judgement. 
In fact, it is evidence of rational deliberation that impoverished 
persons decide whether or not to take advantage of the opportunity to 
earn money as research subjects. If they decide to volunteer, however, 
this choice is determined predominantly, if not entirely, by the lure of 
financial gain. Altruistic goals of benefiting society and curiosity 
about biomedical research are unlikely determinants. Newton asserts 
with great idealism that it is possible to "...keep monetary inducements 
down to the point where they alone could not fully explain anyone's 
participation in the research."^5 Macklin, more realistically, finds 
the expectation of subjects' identification with the goals of research 
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to be "...at odds with what empirical evidence reveals about the nature 
of biomedical research. "^6 
Macklin accepts that virtually all impoverished persons who 
participate in research are motivated by money and asserts that this 
motivation is dominated by poverty. This realism stops, however, where 
Macklin starts to argue that low socioeconomic status has ethically 
relevant effects on persons' decision-making capacity. She concludes 
that: "In the absence of coercing people, [protection of impoverished 
persons] does not properly count as [unwarranted] paternalism, but is 
rather an expression of another ethical precept: concern for the welfare 
of our fellow human beings."^7 
Macklin is making more a psychosocial appeal for humanism than an 
ethical argument. Whether or not "concern for the welfare of our fellow 
human beings" is the same as respect for persons, low socioeconomic 
status would have to be extreme to deny such integrity and 
responsibility and to cause such weakness of will that diminished 
autonomy becomes ethically relevant and justifies paternalism. Macklin 
implies that the behavior of underprivileged persons is practically an 
inevitable consequence of economic deprivation. Although it is 
reasonable that impoverished persons, in spite of welfare or 
unemployment benefits, are tempted to take advantage of large wages to 
become research subjects, it is not always causal that this temptation 
is undue. 
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Morey is one of the ordinary seductions and temptations in normal 
life. There is little doubt that welfare recipients are willing to take 
greater risk than students or wage earners in order to secure money. 
However, it does not follow that impoverished persons participate in 
research that they do not consider to serve their own best interests. 
Respect for persons is not served by consigning impoverished persons to 
protection from large payments (and, therefore, from risk of injury) 
when they themselves retain the capacity to to deliberate about harms 
and benefits. 
Offers of cash payment are not threats to participate in research. 
They are not coercive. Although restrictions on compensation are 
intended to be for the good of impoverished persons, (whether or not 
they agree that it is for their own good), unwarranted paternalism 
arises when these restrictions are placed on monetary inducements 
because higher sums are believed to impair the capacity of volunteers to 
judge the risks of participation in research. If a cash payment is not 
coercive, can the impairment of judgement of risk by impoverished 
persons be ethically relevant? Is cash payment ever tempting enough to 
be undue? 
The answer to these questions is yes. However, research rarely 
satisfies the criteria for which payment is undue. These criteria are 
stringent. Given that potential research subjects include impoverished 
persons, the most important criteria include the highest acceptable risk 
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approved by IRBs and the payment comparable to a typical welfare or 
unemployment check. 
Risk of Injury: The ethical principle of beneficence requires 
that research involving risk be justified on the condition of a 
favorable balance of harms and benefits. DHHS regulations stipulate 
that research should not be started unless "[rlisks to the subjects 
[are] reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to 
subjects, and the importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be 
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expected to result." For research already in progress, DHHS 
regulations require that "lain IRB shall ...suspend or terminate 
approval of research ...that has been associated with unexpected serious 
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harm to subjects." IRBs are required to review all research 
protocols funded by federal agencies (Yale Medical School requires IRB 
review regardless of funding source). 
For normal, healthy volunteers, however, the condition of a 
favorable harm-benefit ratio is necessary but not sufficient . The risk 
of injury in a protocol may be unjustified although the harm-benefit 
ratio is favorable (as when potential benefits to society are considered 
to be extremely great). Although IRBs protect subjects by disapproving 
or terminating research that presents an unfavorable harm-benefit ratio 
or an unreasonable risk of injury, this paternalism is justified. Only 
the various experts (clinical specialists and scientists, lawyers and 
clergy) found on IRBs can be expected to evaluate effectively the risk 
of injury in potentially harmful research. 

- 85 - 
Although IRBs disapprove those protocols presenting clearly 
unreasonable risk, they approve others presenting risk that borders on 
unreasonable. These latter protocols present what may be categorized as 
the highest acceptable risk of injury to research subjects; in addition, 
these are the protocols with ethical relevance to decisions about due 
and undue monetary inducements. A practical way of identifying 
protocols that present the highest acceptable risk may be to measure the 
amount of time IRBs devote to the discussion of potential harms. While 
IRBs devote relatively less time to discussion of risk that is clearly 
unreasonable or minimal, they devote substantial amounts of time 
deciding about risk that borders on unreasonable. If a protocol is 
determined to present the highest acceptable risk, then IRBs must give 
consideration to the expected population of research subjects. Based on 
the expectation of impoverished persons serving as research subjects, 
IRBs must be restrict monetary reward in order to prevent undue 
inducement to consent to risk of injury. 
Size of Payment: In its regulations on research involving human 
subjects, DHHS stipulated no guidelines or instructions for determining 
when payments to normal, healthy volunteers are excessive. The 
regulations state only that: "Where some or all of the subjects are 
likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence, such as ... 
persons who are economically disadvantaged, [IRB approval requires that] 
appropriate safeguards have been included in the study to protect the 
rights and welfare of these subjects. Only this general statement 
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is possible because of the broad range of vulnerablilty presented by 
different classes of persons. Each protocol must be considered in light 
of its predicted harms and expected subject population. 
By definition, impoverished persons need money to purchase what 
they perceive are basic necessities of life. Extrinsic constraints 
notwithstanding, these persons attach greater value and utility to wages 
and to the opportunity to earn wages than do students, professionals and 
most other classes of individuals. The utility of payment may become so 
great that it outweighs the experience of physical harm, discomfort and 
even pain. The weight of this utility is ethically relevant and 
justifies the decision of impoverished persons to expose themselves to 
risk of injury. Payment is not undue because it provides relief that is 
needed desperately. Restriction of payment that is not undue limits the 
choices of autonomous agents and deprives impoverished persons of the 
opportunity to earn as much money as possible. It violates not only 
respect for persons but also a third precept of justice. As this precept 
is interpreted by Newton: "...[Jlustice demands that the opportunity to 
earn money by shouldering [research] burdens should be extended first to 
the least advantaged of the society 
A monetary inducement can manipulate the vulnerability of 
impoverished persons and can impair their capacity of persons to judge 
risk of injury. Even if such impairment occurs, however, payment may be 
acting much as a bribe and may not necessarily be unjustified. In order 
for a monetary inducement to be undue, it must cause persons to 
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participate in research that presents either unreasonable risk (such as 
permenant disability and death) or the highest acceptable risk of 
physical or psychological injury and pain. If IRBs successfully fulfill 
their duty, vulnerable populations are protected from exposure to 
unreasonable risk. In the case of research presenting the highest 
acceptable risk, excessive payment is not justified. Vulnerable, 
impoverished persons are entitled to protection and the principle of 
respect for persons justifies restriction of size of payment. 
The precise determination of what is justified payment depends on 
particular variables such as the duration of the protocol (whether 
research procedures extend over hours or over days) and the number of 
return visits (whether extra reimbursement is necessary to defray the 
cost of travel, meals and miscellaneous expenditures). These additional 
expenditures may be calculated protocol by protocol and may be added to 
some baseline payment that is pegged to a percentage of the standard, 
monthly welfare or unemployment check. Because these checks are often 
the largest sums of money with which impoverished persons come into 
contact, undue inducement would certainly include payment that equals or 
surpasses them. 
Referring to the study of hepatic glucose uptake in normal, 
healthy volunteers, it is instructive to consider the criteria of 
highest acceptable risk and size of payment. 
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In this research, neither is the risk of injury unreasonable nor 
is the harm-benefit ratio unfavorable. Although this physiology study 
exemplifies a class of protocols presenting the highest risk that IRBs 
usually review (for normal, healthy volunteers), this study was approved 
based on the following statistics (and based on the policy that subjects 
receive free therapy for research induced injury). In the experience of 
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the investigators: 1) in over 4000 peripheral venous 
catheterizations, there were only twelve recorded episodes of 
thrombophlebitis; none of these episodes had known, significant 
sequelae. 2) in over 500 brachial and femoral arterial catheterizations, 
there were no significant complications; several patients experienced 
subcutaneous hematomas that all resolved spontaneously without sequelae. 
3) on passage of the catheter through the right atrium, only an 
occasional patient experienced premature contractions; there had been no 
atrial or ventricular tachycardia and no requirement of anti-arrhythmic 
therapy. 4) the incidence of infection with hepatic venous 
catheterization was zero. 
In this physiology study, investigators proposed that volunteers 
should receive one hundred dollars. This monetary inducement, although 
substantial for only six hours of procedures, was approved by an 
IRB.^3 One hundred dollars was considered to be not only low enough 
to avoid undue inducement of vulnerable persons, but also high enough to 
remunerate fairly for the risk of injury presented by the research 
procedures. 
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CONCLUSION 
Historical precedents of abuses of the voluntariness of vulnerable 
populations - prisoners during World War II, elderly patients at the 
JCDH, the mentally ill at Milledgeville, and uneducated blacks in the 
Tuskagee syphylis study - have magnified concern about the possibility 
of similar abuses of the voluntariness of impoverished persons. The 
tendency to ascribe the same dependency to the relationship between 
research subjects and investigators as exists in the relationship 
between patients and clinicians also has magnified concern about 
protection of impoverished persons. The objective of this discussion 
has been to identify ethically relevant criteria for distinguishing due 
from undue monetary inducements and, thereby, to demonstrate that the 
attention given to undue payment is warranted only under stringent 
criteria. 
Many factors interfere with the autonomy of normal, healthy 
volunteers and impair their capacity to make a rational decision about 
participating in research. Important factors include the disclosure of 
information about the procedures of a protocol, its harms and benefits, 
the language used in the consent form, the interaction between 
investigator and potential subjects, and the setting and timing for 
obtaining informed consent. Attention to these factors relating to the 
consenting process most effectively maximizes the voluntariness of 
subjects to refuse participation in research. In general, IRBs should 
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devote more attention to the consenting process than to restrictions of 
cash rewards. 
Research involving minimal risk or small increments above minimal 
risk is comparable to simple employment. If subjects are normal, 
healthy volunteers - whether impoverished, enrolled in a university, or 
employed professionally - they should receive unrestricted payment that 
may reflect market forces or the extravagant budget of investigators. 
Given minimal risk, size of payment is not ethically relevant to the 
violation of respect for persons and does not entitle persons with 
diminished autonomy to protection from impaired capacity to refuse 
participation. For research subjects, the bigger the inducement the 
better. 
Research involving more than minimal risk of physical or 
psychological injury requires extra consideration by IRBs if the risk is 
determined to be in the highest acceptable category. Offers of large 
payment may cause vulnerable persons to lose the freedom to choose not 
to participate. Given that the potential subject population includes 
impoverished persons, investigators and IRBs must determine a payment 
that strikes a compromise between undue inducement and remuneration 
appropriate for exposure to possible discomfort, disability and pain. 
Restricted payment protects impoverished persons from irresistable 
temptation and causes them to deliberate more seriously about whether 
participation is in their best interests. 
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In research involving more than minimal risk, IRBs should review 
each protocol according to its own circumstances. Although the primary 
focus should be on the consenting process and on the restriction of 
material reward, IRBs also should be sensitive to the following 
considerations: 
1) Payment should not be reduced to an amount that provides 
sufficient incentive for participation in research but insufficient 
remuneration. Unfortunately for impoverished persons, investigators, 
especially because of diminishing federal grant support of research, 
tend to offer as little payment as the market can bear. Therefore, as 
the probability and magnitude of injury increase, a gap occurs between 
the amount of money required to remunerate fairly for exposure to risk 
and that required to induce the participation of a sufficient number of 
impoverished persons. If subjects are exposing themselves to risk of 
discomfort and pain, this gap should be narrowed as much as possible. 
2) Lowering payment cannot convert "wrong" reasons for 
participating in research into "right" reasons. Subjects of biomedical 
research volunteer primarily because of money and not because of benefit 
to society, identification with research goals or curiosity. As 
subjects become so financially deprived that they are willing to accept 
less payment, participation due to altruism becomes more questionable. 
3) As payment is lowered, persons who need money and who cannot 
find alternative employment fill a greater percentage of the quota of 
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total research subjects required by a particular study. Because this 
quota is inelastic, more impoverished persons, including students, are 
paid less for exposure to the same degree of risk. This selection bias 
exploits impoverished persons and violates the precept of justice 
requiring equitable sharing of research burdens in society. 
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